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I. INTRODUCTION
―[T]he sovereign and the nation must never forget that land is
the sole source of wealth . . . .‖
Francois Quesnay (1694–1774)

1

The history of racially discriminatory housing policies and lending
practices in the United States, including practices such as redlining2 and

1. Francois Quesnay, General Rules for the Economic Government of an Agricultural Kingdom
(1846), translated in VOICES OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: SELECTED READINGS FROM THE
LIBERAL ECONOMISTS AND THEIR CRITICS 3 (John Bowditch & Clement Ramsland eds., 1961)
(noting that Quesnay‘s essay, originally written in 1760, was subsequently published in an 1846
collection of works by leading French economists). A French economist and physician, Quesnay
attempted to explain the source of economic growth in his Tableau Économique by understanding the
relationship between the various economic classes in society. MARK BLAUG, GREAT ECONOMISTS
BEFORE KEYNES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LIVES & WORKS OF ONE HUNDRED GREAT
ECONOMISTS OF THE PAST 194–96 (1986). Quesnay identified three classes: ―‗sterile‘‖ classes,
farmers, and landowners. See id. Sterile classes included those involved in industry and
manufacturing, and according to Quesnay, these classes consumed all that they produced, leaving no
surplus for succeeding periods. Id. The agricultural sector was believed by Quesnay to be the only
class capable of producing a surplus that could help in growing the economy. Id. He was an
advocate of laissez-faire economics and, in fact, coined the term. Id. Quesnay was thought to be the
intellectual leader of the first school of economic thinking, called the ―Physiocrats,‖ and his work
―paved the way for classical economics.‖ 1 MANFRED WEISSENBACHER, SOURCES OF POWER: HOW
ENERGY FORGES HUMAN HISTORY 295 (2009).
2. MEIZHU LUI ET AL., THE COLOR OF WEALTH: THE STORY BEHIND THE U.S. RACIAL
WEALTH DIVIDE 95, 103 (2006) (discussing the earliest practice of ―redlining‖ by the Home Owners‘
Loan Corporation, created in 1933 under the New Deal housing programs by the federal government
to assist homeowners to avoid foreclosure). See also Subprime Lenders Target Minorities: Study
Finds African-American, Hispanics Pay Higher Loan Rates than Whites with Similar Incomes,
CNN.com (May 1, 2002), http://money.cnn.com/2002/05/01/pf/banking/subprime (discussing
discrepancies in rates of subprime lending to minorities); Craig Torres, Regulators Kept Quiet as
Subprime
Lenders
―Targeted‖
Minorities,
Bloomberg.com
(June
13,
2007),
http://www.nedap.org/pressroom/documents/2007-June-13_Bloombergv2.pdf (discussing investigations
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steering,3 created a community of historically disadvantaged borrowers among
black Americans.4 Over time, these borrowers grew accustomed to exploitive
financial services, were targeted by subprime and predatory lenders, and
became victims of our current mortgage crisis.5
My thesis is that blacks are experiencing a new iteration of intentional
housing discrimination in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in the form
of a dual mortgage market. In this dual mortgage market, lenders identify
vulnerable emerging and underserved markets6 of blacks and knowingly target
them to receive subprime or predatory loan products when similarly situated
white borrowers (i.e., white borrowers with similar credit histories, economic
status, and other borrower characteristics typically important to the lending
decision) are given superior, prime mortgage products.7
In Part II of this Article, I discuss the history of housing and lending
discrimination in the United States. I show that the disparities in subprime
into subprime lenders‘ targeting of minorities); see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
3. Traditionally, steering was the practice of directing blacks into segregated neighborhoods.
Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808, 810 nn.10–11
(1976). In the subprime context, steering has taken on new meaning and refers to the process of
marketing subprime products to blacks. Gregory D. Squires, Predatory Lending: Redlining in
Reverse, National Housing Institute: Shelterforce Online (January/February 2005),
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/139/redlining.html.
4. ―Historically disadvantaged borrowers‖ refers to black borrowers as a class of minority
borrowers.
5. See, e.g., IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD
HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 25 (2005); MELVIN L.
OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON
RACIAL INEQUALITY 12–13 (2d ed. 2006); LUI ET AL., supra note 2; THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE
HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2004);
Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit: Preserving the Social
Safety Net of Informality in Small-Loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1217, 1218–19 (2004)
(―Black Americans experience a number of problems in their efforts to obtain and use credit. Of
particular concern is their vulnerability to so-called ‗predatory lenders.‘ . . . Examples of targeted
consumers include women [and] minorities. . . .‖) (citation omitted).
6. Richard Williams et al., The Changing Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage Lending, 52
SOC. PROBS. 181, 191 (2005) (discussing commonly used income and race-based definitions of
underserved markets and stating that alternative definitions that are frequently used yield results that
are consistent with the study‘s finding of racially biased mortgage lending). The term ―emerging
markets‖ is broadly understood to include potential borrowers who may have difficulty
demonstrating a conventional credit history, may be unfamiliar with the credit system, or may have
credit concerns. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 11, 16, 31–80, 152, Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc.,
No. 08-2474-BLS (Mass. Super. Ct. June 3, 2008), available at http://www.mass.gov/
Cago/docs/press/2008_06_03_option_one_suit_attachment1.pdf.
7. See infra Parts III–V; see also William Apgar & Allegra Calder, The Dual Mortgage
Market: The Persistence of Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF
OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 101, 102 (Xavier de
Souza Briggs ed., 2005) (―High-cost lenders disproportionately target minority, especially African
American, borrowers and communities, resulting in a noticeable lack of prime loans among even the
highest-income minority borrowers.‖).
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lending experienced by black borrowers result from intentional reverse
redlining and steering by lenders.
Next, in Part III, I analyze why black borrowers are disproportionately
victims of subprime mortgages and predatory lending. I review various forms
of evidence of intentional discrimination gathered from audit studies,8
individual affidavits, and advertising and marketing literature, in combination
with statistical evidence of disparate impact, to make the case of intentional
housing discrimination.
Part IV presents my study using Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)9
data prepared and distributed by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council pursuant to the Federal Reserve Board‘s Regulation C, as well as
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) data for the years 1998, 2002, and
2006 and disaggregated into the individual fifty states. The study presents an
analysis of the 1998 HMDA data set containing 11,000,077 reported mortgage
applications; the 2002 HMDA data set containing 14,198,111 reported
mortgage applications; and the 2006 HMDA data set containing 21,735,287
reported mortgage applications.10 The HMDA data from 2002 and 2006
contain additional borrower and property information as a result of the 2002
amendments to HMDA regulations.11 The study also used the HUD data set of
subprime lenders (HUD-Classified Subprime Lenders)12 as a tool to identify
those lenders that were prone to give out subprime loans.13 Additionally, the
study used the HMDA criteria to identify subprime lenders that define a
subprime loan as any loan in which the annual percentage rate is three
percentage points or more above the yield on comparable Treasury securities
(Alternative Measure).14 To determine the effect of race of the borrower on the

8. An audit refers to a survey technique in which persons (auditors) are trained to visit housing
agents, lenders, brokers, and others in teams of two and to record how they are treated. John Yinger,
Housing Discrimination Is Still Worth Worrying About, 9 HOUSING POL‘Y DEBATE 893, 894 (1998).
One of the auditors will be a protected class member as defined by civil rights laws and the other will
not be a member of a protected class. Id. The auditor who is not part of a protected class is
considered part of the control group. Id. The protected class auditor will be given borrower
characteristics (in the case of borrower audit studies) that make her equally if not more qualified than
the non-protected class auditor to receive a particular type of loan. Id. ―Discrimination is defined as
systematically less favorable treatment of the auditors in the protected class.‖ Id.
9. See infra notes 85–93 and accompanying text discussing HMDA, its origin, and its purposes.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
13. See United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Data Sets: HUD
Subprime
and
Manufactured
Home
Lender
List,
http://www.huduser.org/
portal/datasets/manu.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2010) [hereinafter HUD User Data Sets] (listing
subprime lenders).
14. Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, 92 FED.
RES. BULL. A123, A126 (2006) (discussed as higher priced home lending); Home Mortgage
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lender‘s behavior, the study used two methods: difference of means tests15 and
logit analysis.16 First, the study used difference of means tests to compare
applicant and lending behavior on subprime loans for white and black
borrowers (State Data Means Test). The study provides overwhelming
evidence that black borrowers are carrying the brunt of the subprime market.17
Second, the study used logit analysis to predict the probability that a borrower
will receive a subprime (versus a prime) loan (State Data Control Test). Using
logit analysis allowed me to control for borrower characteristics, including
race, house characteristics, and neighborhood characteristics. This analysis
demonstrates that, in the majority of states, being black increases the likelihood
that a borrower will receive a subprime loan, even when neighborhood
characteristics, the income of the borrower, and the value of the house are
controlled for.18 While the study could not control for all of the factors that
lenders examine when making loans, this analysis shows that when
neighborhood characteristics, borrower income, and the value of the houses are
held constant, black borrowers are significantly more likely to receive a
subprime loan product than are white borrowers in the majority of states. As
explained in Part IV, this analysis allows me to remove the effects of
neighborhood characteristics, borrower income, and value of the house, and
examine the effect of race without these competing factors. Tables containing
the data from the study are found in the appendix to this Article. As Table 6
shows, being a black borrower is continually, statistically significant, while
other factors fall in and out of significance.
In Part V, I discuss direct evidence of intentional discrimination.
Testimony from industry insiders, judicial opinions, and audit studies are the
primary sources of evidence of intentional discrimination. Combined, the
evidence presented in Parts III through V makes the case of intentional
discrimination based upon race in the subprime market.
In Part VI, I focus on American society‘s historically race-related

Disclosure Act: Newly Collected Data and What It Means: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong.
47–49 (2006) (statement of Michael E. Staten, Professor and Director, Credit Research Center at the
McDonough
School
of
Business,
Georgetown
University),
available
at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/109-99.pdf. The reporting thresholds differ based upon
lien status. The threshold for first mortgages is an annual percentage rate that is three percentage
points or more above the yield for a comparable Treasury security and the threshold for subordinate
mortgages is five percentage points. The justification for the difference is the percentages reflect
differences in credit risk, among other things. Avery et al., supra, at A126; Home Mortgage
Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 43,218 (June 27, 2002) (amendments effective January 1, 2004).
15. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part IV.D and Tables 1–6.
18. See infra Part IV.D.
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propensities to target black borrowers through wealth-stripping home
mortgage and refinancing schemes and consider whether there is something
unique about the experiences of black borrowers that predisposes them to
accept loan products that are virtually designed to fail. Necessarily, this Part
considers the role of ―cultural affinity‖19 and the sociology of the poor and of
the minority in exploring why black borrowers were especially vulnerable to
this new form of housing inequality.
Part VII concludes by reiterating the importance of focusing on the
intentional aspect of the subprime and predatory lending discrimination that
has created a dual mortgage market in the United States.
II. CURRENT PROBLEMS IN SUBPRIME PRODUCTS: THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
If progress has been made to increase access to capital for
racial minorities, . . . that progress has always come with
great struggle. And it appears there are few, if any,
permanent victories. The emergence of predatory lending
practices demonstrates that the struggle against redlining has
not been won, but has simply taken some new turns.20
American housing discrimination norms and the attendant inequality in
treatment experienced by the victims of housing discrimination have changed
over time.21 In the 1990s mortgage lenders reinvented discriminatory lending
and housing policies in the form of discriminatory subprime and predatory
lending.22 Steering, reverse redlining,23 and discriminatory mortgage lending
19. STEPHEN L. ROSS & JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT: MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION,
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND FAIR-LENDING ENFORCEMENT 213 (2002); Raphael W. Bostic, A
Test of Cultural Affinity in Home Mortgage Lending, 23 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 89, 89–94 (2003);
Charles W. Calomiris et al., Housing-Finance Intervention and Private Incentives: Helping
Minorities and the Poor, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 634, 635 (1994); William C. Hunter &
Mary Beth Walker, The Cultural Affinity Hypothesis and Mortgage Lending Decisions, 13 J. REAL
EST. FIN. & ECON. 57, 67 (1996).
20. Squires, supra note 3.
21. Juliet Saltman, Theoretical Orientation: Residential Segregation, in URBAN HOUSING
SEGREGATION OF MINORITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1, 9–11
(Elizabeth D. Huttman, Wim Blauw & Juliet Saltman eds., 1991) (discussing the historical racial
inequality and division attending housing segregation).
22. See infra notes 39–45 and accompanying text (discussing predatory lending). Previously,
discriminatory lending and housing policies manifested themselves through redlining, segregation in
selling and renting, and insufficiency of affordable housing.
23. Squires, supra note 3.
After decades of redlining practices that starved many urban communities
for credit and denied loans to racial minorities, today a growing number of
financial institutions are flooding these same markets with exploitative loan
products that drain residents of their wealth. Such ―reverse redlining‖ may be
as problematic for minority families and older urban neighborhoods as has been
the withdrawal of conventional financial services.
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practices were primary implements of discrimination against blacks.
Research reveals that many of the subprime mortgage loans and mortgage
refinance packages offered to blacks were bad products that have done more
to hamper than to help efforts to increase home ownership among blacks. 24
More disturbing is the evidence that lending institutions, their loan officers,
and brokers (collectively, lenders) knew at the time these products were being
specifically marketed to blacks that these borrowers were receiving inferior
products. Estimates are that one half of all subprime borrowers actually
qualified for conventional financing, a disproportionate number of which were
black borrowers,25 even after accounting for ―legitimate risk factors‖26 such as
Id.
24. More than 6 million borrowers accepted subprime loans between 1998 and 2006 and many
already have or will lose their homes to foreclosure. ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR
COST TO HOMEOWNERS 2–3 (2006).
The Center for Responsible Lending has found that subprime lending over
the last nine years will result in more foreclosures than it will create new firsttime homeowners. This net loss in homeownership holds especially true for
African-American and Latino borrowers. For subprime originations made in
2005, among African Americans and Latinos, [estimates are] that there will be
84,000 more foreclosures than there will be first-time homeowners.
Delvin Davis, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: The Impact of Subprime Foreclosures on AfricanAmerican and Latino Communities, POVERTY & RACE (Poverty & Race Research Action Council,
Wash., D.C.), May/June 2007, at 12. Estimates are that
2.2 million families will lose or have lost their homes to foreclosure due to
reckless subprime lending, including one out of every five subprime mortgages
made in 2005 and 2006. . . . [T]he losses associated with the 2.2 million
completed foreclosures, if not averted, will total $265 billion in wealth lost by
American families not facing foreclosure.
Straightening Out the Mortgage Mess: How Can We Protect Home Ownership and Provide Relief to
Consumers in Financial Distress? (pt. I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin.
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 21 (2007), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/37978.PDF (emphasis omitted) (statement of Eric
Stein, Senior Vice President, Center for Responsible Lending). The losses from subprime lending
exceeded $300 billion by the spring of 2008. P AUL MUOLO & MATTHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF
BLAME: HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS, at x (2008). By then,
approximately 1 million people had lost their homes, and it is predicted that, by the end of the
decade, another 2 or 3 million will join them as subprime victims. Id.
25. Williams et al., supra note 6, at 189 (citing Franklin D. Raines, former CEO of Fannie Mae,
and Edward Gramlich, a former Federal Reserve Board Governor); see infra Part IV.
26. DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING:
THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 3 (2006), available
at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/unfair-lending-the-effectof-race-and-ethnicity-on-the-price-of-subprime-mortgages.html; Manny Fernandez, Racial Disparity
Found Among New Yorkers with High-Rate Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at B1 (discussing
New York neighborhoods where subprime mortgages were common and those in which they were
rare and stating ―that even when median income levels were comparable, home buyers in minority
neighborhoods were more likely to get a loan from a subprime lender‖).
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smaller down payments and poorer credit histories.27 More than three decades
after the enactment of the major federal fair lending laws,28 black borrowers
―continue to have less-than-equal access to loans at the best price and on the
best terms that their credit history, income, and other individual financial
considerations merit.‖29 The net result was that, generally, black borrowers
purchased more expensive loans than their credit profiles qualified them for,
as compared to whites with similar borrower characteristics.30 The number of
blacks was disproportionate within the universe of consumers of subprime
loans as compared with the percentage of blacks in the general population.31
Because of racial discrimination in the home mortgage and refinance market,
―people of color are more likely than whites with similar borrower
characteristics to be victims of predatory lending, to receive higher cost loans,
and to lose their homes to foreclosure.‖32 The foreclosure of these subprime
loans will result in a net loss in home ownership in the black community and

27. BOCIAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 3; ROSS & YINGER, supra note 19, at 25; Minority
Subprime Borrowers, CONSUMERS UNION SWRO (Consumers Union, Austin, Tex.), Oct. 2002, at 3,
available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/au-minority-rpt.pdf. The Consumers Union study
analyzed Texas refinance loans between 1997 and 2000. Id. at 1.
28. ―Fair lending laws‖ frequently refers to the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA), the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), and their implementing
regulations. Warren W. Traiger, New Fair Lending Initiatives, REV. BANKING & FIN. SERVS.
(Standard & Poor‘s, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 4, 1998, at 1 n.1, available at
http://www.traigerlaw.com/publications/new_fair_lending_initiatives_the_review_of_banking_&_
financial_services_3_4_98.pdf. The CRA was intended to encourage covered institutions to meet the
credit needs of low- and moderate-income communities. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006). The Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA) mandates that lenders provide the public with certain
data pertaining to housing-related loans and loan applications. See 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2006). The
ECOA was enacted in 1974 to promote credit availability and prohibit creditors from discriminating
based upon certain criteria, including race, color, or sex. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006). Finally, the 1968
FHA prohibits discrimination in housing-related transactions and housing financing based upon,
among other things, race, color, or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
29. Apgar & Calder, supra note 7, at 102; see also WILLIAM APGAR ET AL., HARVARD UNIV.
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, CREDIT, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CHANGING MORTGAGE BANKING INDUSTRY FOR COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2004),
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/communitydevelopment/ccc04-1.pdf.
30. See ROSS & YINGER, supra note 19, at 61; MICHAEL B. DE LEEUW ET AL., RESIDENTIAL
SEGREGATION AND HOUSING DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES: VIOLATIONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
at ii (2007), available at http://www.ushrnetwork.org/files/ushrn/images/linkfiles/CERD/
17_Housing%20Discrimination.pdf.
31. See infra Parts III and IV and accompanying text.
32. DE LEEUW ET AL., supra note 30, at ii; see also APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 68
(discussing the devastating ripple effects of foreclosure). Foreclosure may undermine the ability of
borrowers to engage in commercial markets—for example, by opening businesses—because of poor
credit. It may also make it more difficult for borrowers to maintain gainful employment by, for
instance, making the cost of securing financing to purchase a car to drive to work too high for the
borrower to afford. Id.
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will erode the property values of non-foreclosed homes.33
The unhealthy growth in subprime lending began in the early 1990s and
exploded in the late 1990s through 2006.34 Subprime lending is the practice
of lending to borrowers who, theoretically,35 do not demonstrate eligibility
under standard credit requirements. The term ―subprime borrower‖ is not
consistently defined by individual financial institutions or in the
marketplace.36 The credit characteristics of subprime borrowers are varied
and can include delinquencies, bankruptcies, judgments, charge-offs or other
negative credit indicators, as well as limited financial resources.37 Lenders
33. NAT‘L CMTY. REINV. COAL., INCOME IS NO SHIELD AGAINST RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN
LENDING II: A COMPARISON OF HIGH-COST LENDING IN AMERICA‘S METROPOLITAN AND RURAL
AREAS 8 (2008); MAJORITY STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., THE SUBPRIME LENDING
CRISIS: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON WEALTH, PROPERTY VALUES AND TAX REVENUES, AND HOW
WE GOT HERE 9 (2007); Williams et al., supra note 6, at 188–89 (stating that, according to a 2004
study, subprime loans ―contributed 28 times as much to neighborhood foreclosures as did prime
loans‖). But see Charles W. Calomiris et al., The Foreclosure–House Price Nexus: Lessons from the
2007–2008 Housing Turmoil 25–26, (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14294,
2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14294.pdf. Calomiris et al. argue that foreclosures
tend to have localized effects on housing prices and that those local effects tend to be less significant
than many assume. The authors control for national and statewide trends in building permit growth
rates, employment growth rates, housing sale rates, single-family permits, and total house prices.
After controlling for these trends, the effects of foreclosures, they conclude, are fairly minimal. Id.
34. Subprime refinance loans grew from 80,000 in 1993 to 790,000 by 1999. ROSS & YINGER,
supra note 19, at 19. In 1994, subprime loans were fewer than 5% of all mortgage originations; their
representation had grown to 13% by 1999. Id.
35. See infra Part III (suggesting that, even after controlling for property and borrower
characteristics that are relevant to the lending decision, race is consistently a statistically significant
factor in determining whether a borrower receives a subprime loan); see infra Part V (discussing
evidence of intentional discrimination in lending based upon race).
36. Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569, 37,570 (July 10, 2007).
Most federal agencies have incorporated the credit risk characteristics of subprime borrowers from
the 2001 Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs. Id.
37. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, EXPANDED GUIDANCE
FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2 (2001).
Generally, subprime borrowers will display a range of credit risk characteristics
that may include one or more of the following:
 Two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12 months, or one or more
60-day delinquencies in the last 24 months;
 Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off in the prior 24 months;
 Bankruptcy in the last 5 years;
 Relatively high default probability as evidenced by, for example, a credit
bureau risk score (FICO) of 660 or below (depending on the
product/collateral), or other bureau or proprietary scores with an
equivalent default probability likelihood; and/or
 Debt service-to-income ratio of 50% or greater, or otherwise limited ability
to cover family living expenses after deducting total monthly debt-service
requirements from monthly income.
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perceive subprime borrowers as higher credit risks than prime borrowers
because of subprime borrowers‘ poorer credit characteristics. Consequently,
subprime loans are more expensive for borrowers than are prime loans and
offer lenders a greater return to compensate for the increased risk associated
with them.38
There is a strong correlation between subprime lending and predatory
lending, though certainly not all subprime loans are predatory and, in fact,
some organizations make responsible subprime loans.39 Unlike subprime
lending, predatory lending is never justified; it is fraught with abuse and
perhaps even fraud.40 ―[A] loan is predatory if the lender knowingly extracts
more surplus from the borrower than the loan delivers to the borrower.‖41
Some common characteristics of predatory loans include (1) excessive fees
and interest rates; (2) abusive prepayment penalties; (3) kickbacks to
mortgage brokers in the form of yield spread premiums; (4) loan flipping; (5)
loose qualifying standards on high-risk loans; (6) mandatory arbitration; and
(7) steering and targeting.42 Generally, predatory lending practices manifest
in one of two forms.43 First, predatory lending occurs when lenders extend
Id. at 2–3.
38. According to the risk/return tradeoff principle, high levels of risk or uncertainty are
associated with high levels of return. Low levels of risk or uncertainty are associated with low
potential returns. The terms risk and uncertainty are used synonymously. See, e.g., Adam Borchert
et al., Understanding Risk and Return, the CAPM, and the Fama-French Three-Factor Model
(Dartmouth Tuck Sch. of Bus. Case & Teaching Paper Series, Case Note No. 03-111, 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=481881 (discussing models for making the relationship between
risk and return more precise and suggesting that investors should only be compensated for risk that
cannot be ―diversified away‖).
39. Three distinct mortgage markets exist: ―the prime market, the ‗legitimate‘ subprime market,
and the predatory market.‖ APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 64. Responsible subprime lending can
expand the credit opportunities of black borrowers; however, lending institutions, their loan officers,
and brokers must understand and attend to the unique risks that accompany subprime lending and
refinancing. ROSS & YINGER, supra note 19, at 19–20.
40. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2044 (2007).
41. Philip Bond et al., Predatory Lending in a Rational World 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila.,
Working Paper No. 06-2, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875621.
42. Fact Sheet, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Predatory Mortgage Lending Robs
Homeowners & Devastates Communities, available at http://www.dupontfund.org/learning/
pdfs/predatory_mortgage_lending.pdf; Austin, supra note 5, at 1218; Howell E. Jackson & Laurie
Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J. L.
BUS. & FIN. 289, 296 (2007) (―[Y]ield spread premiums are not simply another form of mortgage
broker compensation, but rather a unique form of compensation that allows mortgage brokers to
extract excessive payments from many consumers.‖).
43. See Bond et al., supra note 41, at 1 (―Predatory lending is associated with highly
collateralized loans, inefficient rolling over of subprime loans, lending with disregard to ability to
pay, prepayment penalties, balloon payments and poorly informed borrowers.‖); see also JAMES H.
CARR & LOPA KOLLURI, FANNIE MAE FOUND., PREDATORY LENDING: AN OVERVIEW 2,
http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/text_document_summary/article/relfiles/hot_topics/Carr-
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credit to borrowers on terms that are inconsistent with the amount of credit
risk the lender is assuming. Excessive fees and interest rates and prepayment
penalties are examples of some of these types of terms.44 Second, predatory
lending can be characterized by loans that are made without appropriate
regard for the borrower‘s ability to repay.45
The federal government has intervened at various points through
regulation and legislation to address housing and mortgage lending
discrimination.46 The intervention was often in response to pervasive
discrimination by lenders and others involved in the insurance and lending
sectors. For example, the Community Reinvestment Act of 197747 (CRA)
was passed in response to concerns of redlining in lending. Congress passed
the CRA to encourage federally insured thrifts and banks to meet the credit
needs of their entire communities, including minority households, consistent
with safe and sound banking practices.48 Redlining,49 refusing to lend to
Kolluri.pdf (suggesting that there are as many as three categories into which predatory loans typically
may be cast):
Generally speaking, three features—alone or in combination—define predatory
lending practices. Those features include targeted marketing to households on
the basis of their race, ethnicity, age or gender or other personal characteristics
unrelated to creditworthiness; unreasonable and unjustifiable loan terms; and
outright fraudulent behavior that maximizes the destructive financial impact on
consumers of inappropriate marketing strategies and loan provisions.
Id.
44. Bond et al., supra note 41, at 2.
45. Id.
46. See infra notes 47–48, 57 & 60 and accompanying text.
47. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006).
48. Id. § 2901(b).
49. The practice of redlining dates back at least to the 1930s when the Home Owners‘ Loan
Corporation mapped hundreds of cities to indicate the ―safe‖ areas for federal insurance of home
loans. The practice of redlining
appears to have originated in 1935, when the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
asked the Home Owners‘ Loan Corporation to create ―residential security
maps‖ for 239 cities that would indicate the level of security for real estate
investments in each surveyed city. The resulting maps designated four
categories of lending and investment risk, each with a letter and color
designation. Type ―D‖ areas, those considered to be the riskiest for lending and
which included many neighborhoods with predominantly African-American
populations, were color-coded red on the maps—hence the term ―redlining.‖
Private lenders reportedly constructed similar maps that were used to determine
credit availability and terms. The 1961 Report on Housing by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights reported practices that included requiring high
down payments and rapid amortization schedules for African-American
borrowers as well as blanket refusals to lend in particular areas.
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at Community
Affairs Research Conference, The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges
2 (Mar. 30, 2007) (citations omitted), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
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borrowers in communities with high concentrations of minorities, reduced the
amount of capital available in the redlined communities for home acquisition
and improvement.50 Redlining reduced the supply of financing in targeted
neighborhoods and therefore demand for these homes, resulting in a slower
rate of home appreciation compared to non-targeted neighborhoods.51
Existing homeowners in redlined communities had greater difficulty selling
their homes and realizing the appreciated value that those in non-redlined
neighborhoods experienced. Redlining also made it more difficult for black
borrowers to access credit to start or improve businesses. The predictable
outcome was that those in redlined areas have not only less access to credit
but also lower incomes, lower credit scores, higher debt-to-value ratios, and
lower home values.52
While the CRA expanded access to credit and residential mortgages for
many, it has not evolved to address changes in the financial market for
subprime mortgages.
Most subprime mortgages are originated by
53
nondepository institutions and packaged by mortgage brokers54 that are not
covered by the CRA.55 Moreover, most subprime mortgage originators are
not prime lenders, which is troubling for borrowers as ―subprime lending by
prime lenders is probably less prone to abuse, since prime lenders also offer
lower-cost products, work less with brokers, and are often subject to greater
regulatory scrutiny.‖56
Additionally, the Federal Fair Housing Act57 (FHA) was passed to
prohibit discrimination in residential real estate-related transactions. The
speech/bernanke20070330a.htm.
50. Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 516 (2005).
51. See generally Williams et al., supra note 6, at 202 (discussing the consequences of housing
segregation on blacks‘ access to networks of service providers and on their vulnerability to racial and
economic targeting by lenders).
52. See Barr, supra note 50, at 516 (―Economic theories predict that low-income communities
generally would have lower access to capital than they would in a fully functioning market because
of market failures, in addition to discrimination.‖).
53. The term ―nondepository institutions‖ refers to financial institutions that extend credit to
borrowers in the form of loans but that do not accept bank deposits. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Regional
Economic
Accounts,
http://www.bea.gov/regional/definitions/nextpage.cfm?key=
Nondepository%20institutions (last visited July 30, 2010).
54. Mortgage brokers are loan intermediaries, or loan originators, who bring borrowers and
lenders together. Mortgage brokers do not fund the loan. 2 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 11.1, at 76 (5th ed. 2007). They have a significant role in
the residential mortgage market. The mortgage broker will take relevant information from the
borrower, produce the necessary loan documents, and supervise the loan closing. Id. ―The loan will
be closed in the lender‘s name, and the lender will underwrite, fund, and often service the loan.‖ Id.
55. Bernanke, supra note 49, at 11–12; THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS, supra note 33, at 18.
56. Williams et al., supra note 6, at 191.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
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FHA covers many forms of housing discrimination and prohibits
discrimination against individuals because of their race and other
characteristics in the sale or rental of housing.58 The FHA makes it unlawful
to discriminate in residential real estate-related transactions because of a
borrower‘s race. Such transactions include the provision of financial
services.59
Moreover, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act60 (ECOA) prohibits creditors
from discriminating against applicants in regards to a credit transaction on the
basis of, among other things, the applicants‘ race, color, national origin, or
marital status. For example, under the ECOA, a creditor would be prohibited
from ignoring the earnings of a female mortgage applicant when determining
whether a family qualifies for a mortgage.61 Lenders historically discounted
or ignored the earnings of female applicants, considering only the husband‘s
or male applicant‘s income, and attributed their conduct to the inherent

58. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2006):
(a) In general—
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes
engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against
any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions
of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin.
(b) ―Residential real estate-related transaction‖ defined—
As used in this section, the term ―residential real estate-related transaction‖
means any of the following:
(1) The making or purchasing of loans or providing other financial
assistance—
(A) for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a
dwelling; or
(B) secured by residential real estate.
(2) The selling, brokering, or appraising of residential real property.
Id.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006):
(a) Activities constituting discrimination—
It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant,
with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction—
(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status,
or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract);
(2) because all or part of the applicant‘s income derives from any public
assistance program; or
(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under this
chapter.
Id.
61. See id.
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uncertainty attending women‘s commitment to remaining in the workforce
because of the competing demands of motherhood and family rearing.62
Despite these fair lending laws, discrimination by the financial services
and insurance industries limited the access of black borrowers to housing and
finance opportunities and segregated them into communities that were easy
for lenders to target for disparate treatment with subprime loans. These fair
lending laws improved black borrowers‘ access to credit and capital, but those
resources often are provided by subprime and predatory lenders.
National leaders, in blind pursuit of the ―ownership society,‖63 led the
country into a perilous housing trap too complex to understand for many
caught in that trap, perhaps until it was too late. Nationally, home ownership
rates have steadily fallen since 2005, reaching a ten-year low in the first
quarter of 2010.64 Many assumed that more lending and greater access to
credit for black communities was desirable.65 But more lending is not the
same as responsible lending, and these same communities that have been
struggling to bridge the home ownership gap66 created by historical housing
62. Federal Citizen Information Center, Consumer Handbook to Credit Protection Laws:
Applying for Credit, http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic_text/money/protectionlaws/apply.htm (last
visited July 30, 2010).
Both men and women are protected from discrimination based on gender
or marital status. But many of the law‘s provisions were designed to stop
particular abuses that generally made it difficult for women to get credit. For
example, denying credit or offering less favorable credit terms based on the
misperception that single women ignore their debts when they marry, or that a
woman‘s income ―doesn‘t count‖ because she‘ll stop work to have and raise
children, is unlawful in credit transactions.
Id. Black women, in particular, have been targets of subprime and predatory lenders. This Article
does not focus on the unique experiences of black women borrowers with subprime and predatory
lending. The issue of gender-based intentional discrimination will be addressed in my forthcoming
article.
63. In an October 2004 speech, George W. Bush said: ―‗We‘re creating . . . an ownership
society in this country, where more Americans than ever will be able to open up their door where
they live and say, welcome to my house, welcome to my piece of property.‘‖ Naomi Klein,
Disowned by the Ownership Society, NATION, Feb. 18, 2008, at 10 (quoting President George W.
Bush, Remarks to the National Association of Home Builders (Oct. 2, 2004), http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041002-7.html).
64. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the First
Quarter 2010 tbls.4 & 4SA (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr110/
files/q110press.pdf.
65. Contra APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 67 (―Increasing default and foreclosure rates have
led many analysts to question whether the recent increase in low-income homeownership—built in
part on the rapid growth of subprime lending—is sustainable or even desirable.‖).
66. ―[I]f you own something, you have a vital stake in the future of our country. The more
ownership there is in America, the more vitality there is in America, and the more people have a vital
stake in the future of this country.‖ President George W. Bush, Remarks at the National Federation
of Independent Businesses (June 17, 2004), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2004/06/20040617-7.html. But see A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home

2010]

RACE TO THE SUBPRIME

921

discrimination are finding that many of the gains previously made will be lost
to foreclosures.67
―[I]ndustry apologists frequently dismiss findings of disparate treatment
[in mortgage lending] as simply the failure to distinguish ‗risk from race.‘‖68
Evidence of pervasive disparate treatment of blacks across the home mortgage
and refinance industry is very difficult to gather for several reasons.69 First,
mortgage financing is a complex, multistage endeavor. At each stage of the
process, lenders can intentionally discriminate, and the discrimination can
present differently in each stage.70 This Article focuses on the financing
stage, which is toward the end of the process when black borrowers are more
likely to be offered subprime loans than similarly situated white borrowers.71
Discrimination at this stage deserves more attention from researchers and
analysts.
Second, evidence of disparate treatment because of race is difficult to
gather because past discrimination has created disparities that exist along
racial and ethnic lines within credit criteria that influence home mortgage and
refinance lending. There are many borrower characteristics other than race
that may explain the higher incidence of subprime and predatory loans among
black borrowers as compared to white borrowers.72 Discrimination that
occurred elsewhere in the economy, as well as historic housing
discrimination, has resulted in black borrowers generally having lower
incomes, lower home values, poorer credit histories, and higher obligation-toasset ratios than whites.73 These are important borrower characteristics and a
Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L. REV. 189 (2009)
(challenging home ownership at the root and advocating for a renewed emphasis on affordable
―affordability products‖).
67. See, e.g., Williams et al., supra note 6, at 184. Foreclosure can be devastating to
individuals and to communities. Decreases in property values brought on by neighborhood
foreclosures and deterioration and abandoned properties can cause homeowners to lose wealth and
can negatively impact their ability to repay home loans. Id. But see Calomiris et al., supra note 33,
at i (―The impact of foreclosures on prices, while negative and significant, is quite small in
magnitude.‖).
68. Apgar & Calder, supra note 7, at 112 (citation omitted).
69. See URBAN INST., MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION: A REVIEW OF EXISTING
EVIDENCE 3–5, (Margery Austin Turner & Felicity Skidmore eds., 1999), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/mortgage_lending.pdf; Helen F. Ladd, Evidence on
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 41, 44 (1998) (discussing the points of
potential discrimination during the loan process).
70. Ladd, supra note 69, at 44.
71. See infra Part IV.D.
72. Bernanke, supra note 49, at 2–3; Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston:
Interpreting HMDA Data, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 25 (1996).
73. For example, on the 2000 Census, black homeowners reported a median home value of
$80,600, while white homeowners reported a median home value of $122,800. ROBERT L.
BENNEFIELD, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME VALUES: 2000, at 3 fig.4 (2003),
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refusal to offer a prime loan based on the adverse nature of these
characteristics would not, standing alone, evidence intentional home mortgage
or refinancing discrimination. Whether housing discrimination has reinvented
itself in the subprime and predatory mortgage and refinance markets is
important; equally important is the need to ensure that statistically significant
gaps between blacks and whites in subprime and predatory lending are not
mislabeled as the results of intentionally discriminatory lending practices
when, in fact, they are attributable to borrower and neighborhood
characteristics that could be properly considered in the lender‘s decisionmaking process. Thus, there is much debate regarding whether differentials in
the quality of loan products exist because of legitimate, credit-related factors
that may vary based upon the applicant‘s race and ethnicity or whether the
differences are more directly correlated to race.
Finally, the mortgage financing industry treats credit quality data, the
information used to price loans, as proprietary and has resisted making this
information available, which has effectively enabled the industry to
undermine studies that find evidence of disparate treatment.74 For purposes of
this Article, disparate treatment occurs when black borrowers with equal or
better credit indicators than ―comparable‖ white borrowers receive less
favorable loan terms or products than the white borrowers. Overwhelming
proof of disparate impact can compel an inquiry into discriminatory intent.
And one can imagine evidence of disparate impact so prodigious in light of
the surrounding facts, such as the likeness of white and black borrowers along
all relevant lending criteria, that the only plausible explanation for the
differences in treatment among the groups appears to be an intent to
discriminate based upon race. Against that history, both recent and ancient,
regarding intentional and unintentional discrimination, we now turn to the
evidence that subprime products disproportionately burden black borrowers.
III. THE IMPACT OF RACE: DISPARATE IMPACT EVIDENCE
Numerous organizations have conducted studies of subprime lending to

http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-20.pdf. In addition, 24.9% of the black population
lived under the poverty level, compared to 9.1% of the white population, while black per capita
income ($14,437) was 60% of white per capital income ($23,918). ALEMAYEHU BISHAW & JOHN
ICELAND,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
POVERTY:
1999
(2003),
at
8
tbl.6,
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-19.pdf;
U.S.
Census
Bureau,
http://factfinder.census.gov (per capita income statistics generated on January 21, 2009 by Mirya
Holman using American FactFinder).
74. See, e.g., APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 69–70 (discussing regulators‘ reluctance to make
lenders include certain data that would be helpful in assessing the appropriateness of a loan rate
given a particular borrower‘s characteristics and discussing Congress‘s failure ―to adapt HMDA
collection activities to reflect market trends‖); Editorial, Mortgages and Minorities, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 2008, at A34.
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determine if there is a discernable racial pattern in the marketing and
acceptance of subprime loans. Many of these studies, such as those discussed
below, have concluded that racial patterns exist in subprime lending. The
studies are often localized, examining the impact of subprime lending on the
borrowers of a particular city or state. Therefore, these studies, by
themselves, do not necessarily prove intentional racial discrimination. Still,
when combined with national studies that control for relevant borrower and
property characteristics,75 it becomes increasingly difficult to explain away
stark racial disparities between white and black borrowers in subprime
lending as being unrelated to race.
A 2007 study by New York University‘s Furman Center for Real Estate
and Urban Policy considered racial differences in New York City
neighborhoods when comparing the rates of subprime mortgages in those
neighborhoods. The researchers found that when median income levels
between minority and non-minority neighborhoods were comparable, minority
neighborhoods had more subprime mortgage homebuyers than non-minority
neighborhoods.76 Data related to several key components of mortgage lending
decisions—borrowers‘ assets, the amount of their debt and down payments,
and their individual credit histories—were not included in the researchers‘
analysis.77 The absence of this information makes it more difficult to draw a
direct conclusion that mortgage lenders were intentionally discriminating
against minorities; however, coupled with data indicating that even at higher
income levels black borrowers were significantly more likely than their white
peers to receive subprime loans, the New York University study highlights
national concern about the role of race in mortgage lending decisions.78
Consumers Union, the nonprofit publisher of Consumer Reports, analyzed
Texas refinance loans for the period of 1997 to 2000.79 Consumers Union
concluded that its study
reinforces (for Texas) the findings of several national studies:
race matters. The race/ethnicity of borrowers is a powerful
factor in the penetration of subprime lending in Texas

75. See infra Part IV. Press Release, Or. Ctr. for Pub. Pol‘y, OCPP Finds Racial Pattern in
Oregon‘s Subprime Lending (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.ocpp.org/cgi-bin/display.cgi?page=
nr080131subprime (discussing a 2006 study). ―At all income levels, Oregon‘s African American . . .
borrowers are more likely than whites to have received subprime loans . . . .‖ Id. (emphasis added).
The OCPP was careful to note that its analysis, by itself, did not prove racial discrimination in
lending, but that combined with other national data, the study uncovered inexplicable racial
differences. Id.
76. Fernandez, supra note 26.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Minority Subprime Borrowers, supra note 27, at 1.
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communities. [The] study shows that subprime loans are
concentrated in geographical areas with a higher
concentration of minority residents. Even after accounting
for other factors, the likelihood of getting a subprime loan
increases for minority borrowers, especially Black borrowers.
Among higher income borrowers, the distinction between
subprime lending to Whites and subprime lending to
minorities is stark.80
Consumers Union, noting that black borrowers statistically have fewer
assets and earn less than white borrowers, which negatively affects their credit
scores and loan underwriting, accounted for the impact of these factors on
lending decisions by analyzing all Texas home purchases and refinances in
which the borrowers earned more than 1.5 times the state‘s median income
($60,000 or more annually) and borrowed less than 2.5 times their reported
income.81 Consumers Union found that even at upper income levels, the rate
of subprime financing and refinancing was highly correlated to race. Upper
income whites refinanced with subprime loans at the rate of 16.7% and upper
income blacks at the rate of 46.4%.82
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Boston Fed) issued a report in 1996
interpreting 1990 HMDA data analyzing mortgage lending in Boston,
Massachusetts.83 In the report, the Boston Fed analyzed the mortgage denial
rates of minorities versus non-minorities. The report did not address the quality
of mortgage loans, whether prime or subprime; however, that factor is probative
in its analysis of whether race is a barrier to entrance into the mortgage market.
HMDA was enacted by Congress in 1975 for the purpose of providing the
public with loan data that could be used to aid (1) in discerning lending
patterns that are discriminatory; (2) in verifying whether financial institutions
covered by the legislation are serving their communities‘ housing needs; and
(3) public officials as they attempt to distribute investments from the public
sector in an effort to attract private investments to areas in need.84 As HMDA
was originally enacted, the data required to be reported was very limited and
this limitation has been a point of criticism in the debate regarding whether
studies relying on HMDA data to reveal housing discrimination are reliable
indicators.85
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id.
83. Munnell et al., supra note 72, at 25–26.
84. 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2006); Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act, Background & Purpose, http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/history.htm (last
visited July 31, 2010).
85. ―HMDA data do not include information on credit histories, debt burdens, loan-to-value
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HMDA was amended in 1989; the amendments expanded the coverage of
HMDA‘s reporting requirements.86 The amendments required reporting of
data pertaining to loan applications; prior to the amendments, institutions
were required only to report data regarding loans that were purchased or
originated.87 The 1989 amendments also required most covered institutions to
report mortgage applicants‘ and borrowers‘ race, sex, and income, and to
provide identifying information for the location of the property included in the
application based upon 1990 Census data.88
The 2002 amendments to HMDA regulations added additional reporting
fields and added significantly to the public data required to be disclosed by
mortgage lenders.89 For instance, the amended HMDA regulations required
covered institutions to report the race, sex, and ethnicity of telephone
applicants.90 Covered institutions also had to begin reporting data for loan
pricing. Loan originations for which the annual percentage rate exceeded the
yield for comparable Treasury securities by three percentage points or more
had to be reported.91 Lenders began reporting the new data pursuant to the
2002 amendments in 2004, and the data was released to the public in 2005.92
ratios, and other factors considered in making mortgage decisions . . . .‖ Munnell et al., supra note
72, at 25; APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 56. Critics argue that HMDA data fails to account for
important variables—―the ‗left out variable problem‘‖—and that the omission of these important
variables ―can bias the coefficients on race/ethnicity to the extent that the omitted variables are
correlated with race.‖ Id.
86. The 1989 HMDA amendments are contained in the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, tit. XII, § 1211, 103 Stat.
183, 524–26, which became effective on January 1, 1990. See also Home Mortgage Disclosure, 54
Fed. Reg. 51,356 (Dec. 15, 1989) (announcing Federal Reserve Board regulations implementing
amendments to HMDA).
87. Home Mortgage Disclosure, 54 Fed. Reg. at 51,356–57. Since 1990, HMDA has reported
on loans that were originated and purchased as well. It includes data on applications that were
approved but that were not accepted by lenders, as well as data concerning applications that were
withdrawn or denied. Since 1990, HMDA also has reported data on applications that were closed
because the applicant did not complete the application process. Id. at 51,365 (now codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 203 app. A at 76 (2010)).
88. Id.; Home Mortgage Disclosure, 56 Fed. Reg. 59,853 (Nov. 26, 1991).
89. Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 43,218, 43,223 (June 27, 2002) (now codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 203 app. A at 77–78); see also Consumer Bankers Association, Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act Information Page, http://www.cbanet.org/government/content.cfm?mnitemnumber=&
tnitemnumber=&itemnumber=1198&unitemnumber=&pf=1&snitemnumber= (last visited Aug. 1,
2010).
90. This portion of the 2002 amendments was made applicable as of January 1, 2003. Home
Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 43,218.
91. Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 7222, 7241 (Feb. 15, 2002) (now codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 203 app. A at 78–79). This requirement pertained to loans that were secured by a first lien.
If the loan was secured by a second lien, the threshold was 5% or more above the comparable
Treasury rate. Id.
92. Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 43,218; Consumer Bankers Association, supra
note 89.
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Lenders indicate that many variables, in addition to those that are reported
under HMDA, are important in the lending process, including the stability of
the applicant‘s income stream, credit history reports, credit projection reports,
loan-to-value ratios, total debt obligations, obligation ratios, and net wealth.93
These items are not captured under the HMDA reporting requirements;94
however, the Boston Fed augmented the 1990 HMDA data to account for
thirty-eight additional variables, including the ones mentioned above.95 These
additional variables constituted virtually all of the lender‘s information set as
captured in its loan application form, the lender‘s worksheet, and the credit
report.96 Including the additional borrower data reduced the disparity between
black and white denial rates from the eighteen percentage points originally
reported to slightly over eight percentage points, still statistically and
economically significant.97 Minority applicants with the same personal and
property characteristics of white applicants had a rejection rate of 28% rather
than the more favorable rate experienced by white applicants of 20%.98
The Boston Fed accounted for differences in economic factors that
support higher mortgage denial rates for blacks on non-discriminatory
grounds. These economic factors included disparities in net wealth, strength
of credit histories, lower down payments, and fewer liquid assets.99 The
Boston Fed tested the pervasiveness of possible race bias by questioning
whether racial disparities in rejection rates were due to isolated discriminatory
conduct by one or two institutions in contrast to a market-wide phenomenon
of discrimination.100 Also, it assumed that lenders are driven by a desire to
maximize profit and so it accounted for the possibility that the reason minority
applicants were rejected at higher rates than non-minority applicants was
because lenders, considering the economic characteristics of minority
borrowers, simply judged their loans to be less profitable, a purely economic

93. Munnell et al., supra note 72, at 28.
94. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. ―While lenders are required to report to the
federal government such things as race, gender, census tract, amount of loan and income, they omit
credit score data. By guarding the single most important statistic used in making loans, the lenders
have given themselves a ready shield against charges of discrimination.‖ Mortgages and Minorities,
supra note 74.
95. Munnell et al., supra note 72, at 28–30 (outlining the authors‘ survey).
96. Id. at 28.
97. Id. at 26.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 31.
100. To distinguish market-wide discrimination from the isolated behavior of a select group of
lenders serving minority populations, the Boston Fed divided its test sample into two groups, lenders
that had the greatest number of minority loans and the remaining lenders. Id. at 41. The first group
accounted for only 5% of the lending institutions but 50% of the minority applications. Id.
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decision.101
After supplementing the HMDA data to consider additional borrower
characteristics gathered by lenders in the application process, abstracting for
discrimination found in other areas of the economy, evaluating the study
results to discern the pervasiveness of the role of race across institutions, and
critically analyzing the quality of the HMDA data (correcting for errors),102
the Boston Fed reported that in the Boston area, race has a statistically
significant effect on mortgage lending decisions.103
Moreover, the
discrimination that the study revealed in the form of higher minority denial
rates because of race was widespread across institution types and sizes.104
It is evident that significant differences in acceptance rates for prime
loans, explainable only by race,105 remain after accounting for legitimate
borrower characteristics like wealth, income, credit history, and credit scores.
The lending discrimination studies, audit reports, and data generated from
HUD and HMDA information included in this Article pose important
implications for inequality in housing and lending policy.
In the 1990s, subprime lenders, who had previously represented a much
smaller share of the home mortgage lending and refinance business, accessed
the emerging market of borrowers and produced gains in home ownership at a
faster rate than ever before.106 But, the progress these lenders apparently
made in increasing home ownership among black borrowers is illusory. Many
black borrowers were able to become homeowners only as a result of
accepting the price of inequality—higher interest rate loans with less desirable
terms and even predatory characteristics—all of which increased the
likelihood of default and foreclosure for this already vulnerable group.107 To
the extent subprime lenders have succeeded in stealing borrowers away from
prime lenders, the perceived gains in home ownership for black borrowers has
come at a tremendous price.108
IV. THE IMPACT OF RACE ON BORROWING AND LENDING BEHAVIORS:
1998, 2002, AND 2006 HMDA DATA
This Part of the Article provides a new look at HMDA and HUD data for
the years 1998, 2002, and 2006 to determine the impact of race on subprime
101. Id. at 27, 41.
102. Id. at 45–47.
103. Id. at 47.
104. Id.
105. These differences are also explainable, in part, by gender.
accompanying text.
106. See supra Part II.
107. See id.; see also Williams et al., supra note 6, at 201.
108. See supra Part II; see also Williams et al., supra note 6, at 201.

See supra note 62 and
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and predatory lending. The first part of the study examines the national data
to discern the borrowing behaviors of blacks and whites by determining the
percentage of black and white borrowers by state who (1) applied for
subprime loans and (2) were accepted for subprime loans by the lender.109
The study results show that blacks typically apply for subprime loans and are
accepted for subprime loans at higher rates than whites.110
The second part of the study addresses the question of whether disparities
in subprime rates between black and white borrowers exist because of or in
spite of race. This part of the study controls for relevant borrower, house, and
neighborhood characteristics.111 Patterns similar to those in the first part of
the study are revealed in the second part of the study. Consistently, race has a
statistically significant effect on the likelihood a borrower receives a subprime
loan.112 Black borrowers are more likely than white borrowers to receive a
subprime loan even when other measures that are relevant to the loan decision
are held constant between black and white borrowers.
Section A contains a description of the data used to conduct difference of
means tests, the first part of the study.113 Next, section B contains a
description of the data used in the logit analyses, the second part of the study.
The results of the difference of means test are presented in section C, and the
results of the logit analyses are presented in section D.
A. State Data Means Test for Application and Acceptance for Subprime
Loans Based upon Race—Methodology
The primary data this study used to analyze the attributes of subprime
lending broken down by race is from the 1998, 2002, and 2006 HMDA data
sets. The data sets contain information on every application for a home
mortgage origination or refinance loan made in the United States for those
years. For each loan application, lenders were required to report borrower
characteristics, including borrowers‘ race, gender, and income, as well as
information on the house value and location. In processing the data, HMDA
removed identifying features114 and provided information on the
neighborhood, census tract, or Metropolitan Statistical Area115 (MSA) in
109. See infra Tables 1–3.
110. Id.
111. See infra Tables 4–6.
112. Id.
113. A difference of means test (t-test) compares the means of two groups on a single variable
and uses standard errors to establish whether the means have a statistically significant difference.
LES SEPLAKI, ATTORNEYS‘ DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 243
(1991).
114. Such as the house address.
115. MSA is defined as an urban area containing a minimum of 50,000 inhabitants, including
surrounding counties.
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which the house is located. The 1998 HMDA data set contains 11,000,077
mortgage applications, the 2002 data set contains 14,198,111 mortgage
applications, and the 2006 data set contains 21,735,287 mortgage
applications.116 The HMDA data sets contain multiple applications for the
same borrower, as each lender is required to log every application regardless
of whether it is completed or leads to a lending decision. All incomplete
applications were removed from the data set for cleaning and streamlining
purposes. All applications where the borrower or co-borrower was black or
white were identified. Submitted applications in which neither the borrower
nor the co-borrower were black or white were removed.117 The study begins
by examining the 2006 HMDA data set, which also logs information on the
lender, the borrower, the loan, and the house. Due to state level fluctuations
in home prices and lending practices, and for data management reasons, each
state‘s lending patterns are modeled individually. In addition, modeling the
states separately eliminates the need to use a state fixed-effects model.118
After cleaning this data, subprime loans were identified through two
processes. First, since 2004, HMDA has required lenders to report the rate of
any loan where the annual percentage rate is three percentage points or more
above the yield on a comparable Treasury security (Alternative Measure).119
This is the first category of subprime loans, which is examined and identified
in Table 4. Using this data, loans that have a subprime rate can be identified
through the HMDA data set. The Treasury rate spread measure of subprime
loans is not available for the 1998 and 2002 data.120
Second, using the 2005 HUD list121 of subprime lenders, each lender that
is listed by HUD as a subprime lender was marked (HUD-Classified
Subprime Lender).122 HUD identified subprime lenders based upon the
percentage of their overall loans that qualified as subprime.123 This is the
116. All data on the number of applicants is from HMDA data and refers to the number of
applications from white and black borrowers.
117. This Article is concerned about the impact of subprime and predatory lending practices on
black borrowers. While evidence indicates that other minority groups may be experiencing negative
impacts, the focus of this Article is on black borrowers as a class.
118. A fixed-effects model would require a constant dummy variable for each state, which
would greatly expand the size of each model and prevent me from examining state-by-state trends.
119. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
120. This measure of subprime loans results from the amendments to HMDA regulations noted
in Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 7222, 7241 (Feb. 15, 2002) (now codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 203 app. A at 78–79) (amendments effective January 1, 2004). Therefore, this measure of
subprime loans is not available for data from the years 1998 and 2002.
121. A one-year lag between the HUD subprime lender list and the HMDA data is acceptable
and recommended by HUD.
122. See HUD User Data Sets, supra note 13 (detailing how HUD classifies lenders as
subprime).
123. Id.

930

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:907

second category of subprime loans, which is examined and identified in
Table 5.
The first method of identifying subprime loans, by the Alternative
Measure, will identify subprime loans given by prime lenders. The second
method of identifying subprime loans, through the HUD-Classified Subprime
Lenders, focuses on lenders who routinely engage in subprime lending
practices.124 These lenders include, but are not limited to, lenders whose loans
are determined to be subprime because of their high interest rates. Some
loans are classified as subprime because of loan characteristics other than the
interest rates, such as excess fees, prepayment penalties, interest-only loans,
balloon payments, and other predatory lending practices.125
The combination of these two methods of identifying subprime loans
allows for a more thorough examination of the lending and borrowing
behavior surrounding subprime lending. Using both methods to identify
subprime loans is important, as they capture different populations. The
Alternative Measure encompasses the loans that fit the standard definition of a
subprime loan, regardless of whether they are given out by a prime or
subprime lender. As prime lenders frequently lend money at subprime rates,
it is important to look at those loans. The HUD-Classified Subprime Lender
method allows the incorporation of all the loans that are given out by
subprime lenders, regardless of whether the rate itself is subprime. This
allows the inclusion of loans that may not have a high rate but fit other
124. Id.
HUD uses a number of HMDA indicators to identify potential subprime
lender specialists. First, subprime lenders typically have lower origination rates
than prime lenders. Second, home refinance loans generally account for higher
shares of subprime lenders‘ total originations than prime lenders‘ originations.
Third, lenders who sell a significant percentage of their portfolios to the
[government-sponsored enterprises] do not typically specialize in subprime
lending. The rate spread variable available for the first time with the 2004
HMDA data can also be used as a screen to identify potential subprime lender
specialists. As would be expected, the ranking of potential subprime lenders
using the HUD indicators is very similar to the ranking of potential subprime
lenders using the rate spread premium variable alone.
HUD called the lenders identified on the potential list or reviewed their
web pages to determine if they specialized in subprime lending. A large
number of lenders told us that they offer subprime loans but they do not
constitute a large percentage of their overall conventional mortgage
originations. Most lenders readily identified themselves as prime or subprime
lender specialists. Some lenders identified themselves as all-purpose lenders
and broke out their loan portfolios by mortgage product. In a couple of cases,
we identified a lender as subprime if their subprime percentage exceeded
50 percent.
Id.
125. See id.
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criteria, such as excessive fees, adjustable rate mortgages, and interest-only
mortgages where the annual percentage rate is not three percentage points or
more above the yield for comparable Treasury securities, but for which a
closer examination might reveal that the paid rate is much higher than the
initial rate. The results of this study are displayed in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
B. State Data Control Test Using Probability of Acceptance for a Subprime
Loan as the Dependent Variable with Race as the Primary Independent
Variable—Methodology
Again, using HMDA data for the years 1998, 2002, and 2006, the study
applies an alternate method to investigate the relationship between race and
subprime loans—logit analysis.126 First, a dichotomous dependent variable
was generated for the analysis, which labels a prime loan as ―0‖ and a
subprime loan as ―1.‖ Using the variable generated, whether someone was
accepted for a subprime loan,127 the following information was regressed:128
the applicant‘s race; the applicant‘s income; the house value; characteristics of
the area where the house is located, including the median income, the percent
of houses that are owner-occupied, the percent of the census tract that are
minorities, and the median income of the MSA.129 The results of this analysis
are presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6.
C. State Data Means Test for Application and Acceptance for Subprime
Loans Based upon Race—Findings
Consistently in 2006, in every state, blacks applied for loans from
subprime lenders more frequently than whites. In every state except for North
Dakota, there was a statistically significant difference between the rate of
subprime applications for white and black borrowers. The rates of subprime
126. Logit analysis is a statistical technique when there are dichotomous dependent variables
(e.g., whether a borrower applied for a subprime or a prime loan).
127. The study used two measures of subprime loan applications; the first is the measure from
HMDA, which requires that lenders report the rate of any loan that is lent at an annual percentage
rate three points or more above the yield on comparable Treasury securities (Alternative Measure).
See HUD User Data Sets, supra note 13 (explaining the methodology behind HUD‘s list). The
second measure uses data from HUD on subprime lenders (HUD-Classified Subprime Lenders). Id.
HUD has routinely identified lenders that it classifies as ―subprime‖ from their lending patterns. Id.
128. Through regression, this methodology attempts to estimate the relationship between each
of these independent variables and the dependent variable (i.e., the probability of receiving a loan
from a subprime lender).
129. The study also separated out whether someone was accepted for a subprime refinance or a
subprime origination loan. These results are remarkably similar to the results presented in Tables 4,
5, and 6, given that whether the applicant is black has a substantive and significant effect on whether
the applicant is accepted for a subprime loan. Generally, race has a larger effect on subprime
origination loans than on subprime refinance loans (up to three times the effect size), but has a
statistically significant effect in both instances in every state but Hawaii, North and South Dakota,
and Montana.
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applications for 2006, along with standard errors and probability values, are
available in Table 1.130
Next, the study examines the percentage of borrowers accepted for loans
by subprime lenders. Again, the differences between black and white
borrowers are striking. For the majority of states, black borrowers qualified
for subprime loans at an average of 2.325 times the rate that white borrowers
qualified for subprime loans. The difference in rates ranges from 6.6% of
white borrowers and 4.3% of black borrowers qualifying in South Dakota to
6% of white borrowers and 20.8% of black borrowers qualifying in
Washington, D.C.131
As an alternate measure of subprime lending, the study examines the rates
of approval for loans that were three percentage points or more above the
yield on comparable Treasury securities (Alternative Measure). The last three
columns of Table 1 indicate that black borrowers were much more likely to
borrow at a rate that was considered ―subprime,‖ in that the rate exceeded the
annual percentage rate for comparable treasury securities by at least three
percentage points. Again, the only places where this pattern does not hold
true are North Dakota and South Dakota, both of which have very low black
populations.
An analysis of two extreme states, North Dakota and Massachusetts,
illustrates the disparate impact of these loans on white and black
communities.132 In 2006 in North Dakota, there were 144 black loan
applicants, 17.4% of whom applied for loans with HUD-Classified Subprime
Lenders. During the same year, there were 27,021 white applicants, 14.2% of
whom applied for loans with HUD-Classified Subprime Lenders. The
acceptance rates did not vary in a statistically significant way based upon
race. Of the black applicants, 9.9% were accepted for loans from subprime
lenders, compared to 7.7% of white applicants. Considering the Alternative
Measure, 16.8% of black applicants received loans that were three percentage
points or more above the yield on comparable Treasury securities, compared
to 17% of white applicants. None of these differences are statistically
significant, suggesting that white and black borrowers in North Dakota had an
equal chance of applying for or being accepted for a subprime loan.
The findings for North Dakota sharply contrast the findings for
Massachusetts. In Massachusetts in 2006, there were 38,055 black applicants

130. Tables 2 and 3 contain information for years 2002 and 1998, respectively.
131. See infra Table 1; South Dakota is the only state where the rate of white borrowers
qualifying for subprime loans is greater than black borrowers. This may be due to state-level
differences in laws governing subprime lending or due to the fact that the black population in South
Dakota is so small; the number of subprime black borrowers in South Dakota is 51.
132. See infra Table 1.
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applying for loans, 36.5% of whom applied for loans with HUD-Classified
Subprime Lenders. During the same year, there were 420,222 white
applicants, 18.3% of whom applied for loans with HUD-Classified Subprime
Lenders. The acceptance rates varied in a statistically significant way based
upon race. Of the black applicants, 32% were accepted for loans from HUDClassified Subprime Lenders; 11.4% of the white applicants were accepted for
loans from HUD-Classified Subprime Lenders. Considering the Alternative
Measure, 37.3% of black applicants received loans that were three percentage
points or more above the yield on comparable Treasury securities, compared
to 15.8% of white applicants. All of these differences are statistically
significant to the 0.000 level. In general, the borrower and lender behavior in
Massachusetts is closer than behavior in North Dakota to the 2006 national
norm: black borrowers applied for subprime loans at a higher rate and were
accepted for these loans at a much higher rate than were white borrowers.
The results from 2002 and 1998 are presented in Tables 2 and 3.133 The
number of subprime applications and of subprime loans was lower in 2002
and 1998 than in 2006.134 In addition, the same pattern that was evident in
2006 was evident in the 2002 and 1998 data—black applicants applied for and
received subprime loans at higher rates than white applicants, albeit at lower
rates than in 2006. However, the difference between the racial groups was
smaller in 2002 and 1998 than in 2006, resulting in some statistical
insignificance.135
As Figures 1 and 2 show, in the years 1998, 2002, and 2006 there has
been a general rise in the number of subprime loans, the share of subprime
loans in the overall lending market, and the racial disparity in applying for and
receiving subprime loans. This suggests that, while the effect of subprime
lending has long been felt by a subset of borrowers, the last ten years have
seen a significant increase in the disparate impact on black borrowers.
D. State Data Control Tests, Using Probability of Acceptance for a Subprime
Loan as the Dependent Variable with Race as the Primary Independent
Variable—Findings
Table 4 contains the results for 2006, which show that in the large

133. For simplicity‘s sake, all the state-level data was collapsed into a single file to assess the
nature of subprime lending in the United States. In 2006, the disparate patterns of subprime lending
across states required either fixed-effects modeling or modeling each state individually. In 2002 and
1998, the number of subprime borrowers and lenders was low enough to collapse states together and
estimate national effects.
134. See infra Tables 1–3.
135. All the differences between white and black borrowers are statistically significant except
for the difference between the number of loans originated with subprime lenders by black and white
borrowers in 1998.
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majority of states, whether the applicant was black (versus white) had a
positive, statistically significant effect on whether a lender approved a
subprime loan, as determined by the Alternative Measure. The only states
where being black did not have a positive, statistically significant effect on
whether the applicant was approved for a subprime loan were states with
smaller black populations, such as Hawaii, North and South Dakota, and
Montana.136 The effect size137 of the black variable ranged from 0.014 to
0.543.138 Other variables move in and out of significance. The amount of the
loan, the percentage of owner-occupied housing, the income of the borrower,
and the HUD median family income have very small coefficients and are
routinely significant. The percentage of the census tract comprised of
minorities does not have a consistent effect.139
The amount of the loan has consistently negative coefficients, meaning
that as the size of the loan increased, the probability that the loan was
subprime decreased.140 The Alternative Measure of subprime lending
contains more borrowers than are contained in the HUD-Classified Subprime
Lenders measure of subprime lending.141 The negative relationship between
136. Due to the multiple log function of logit analysis, the methodology requires a fairly even
distribution of data between the key variables. As such, I was unable to run the analysis for several
states that either had too few observations (e.g., North and South Dakota) or had substantial outliers
for some of the variables. This is largely for the effects reported in Table 5, where the dependent
variable is whether a borrower received a loan from a subprime lender. More results are available in
Table 4, where the dependent variable is whether a borrower received a loan that is three points or
more above the comparable Treasury rate, as there are larger numbers of borrowers under this
criterion of subprime lending.
137. Effect size measures the strength of the relationship between two variables, in this case the
probability of being accepted for a subprime loan and the applicant‘s/ borrower‘s race. The effect
size for Washington, D.C., is larger (0.775), and while the study shows the results, the District is not
included with the state data because it is not a state.
138. As logit is used as the method (because of the non-linearity of the dependent variable),
these results represent changes in probability and cannot be interpreted as direct effect sizes.
139. This suggests that while the amount of the loan, the percentage of owner-occupied
housing, the income of the borrower, and the HUD median family income all have a statistically
significant relationship, there is little substantive relationship between these variables and the
dependent variable. For example, in Alaska, the percentage of the census tract that consists of
minorities has a significant, negative effect on the probability that an individual will receive a loan
from a subprime lender. However, when the substantive effect is examined, we see that the effect (in
Alaska) is -0.001, or a percent increase in the minority population of the census tract decreases the
odds of getting a subprime loan by one tenth of one percent. A 100% increase in the minority
population would lead to a 10% decrease in the odds of getting a subprime loan. This may be
counterintuitive, as the extant literature and this research suggest that minorities bear the brunt of the
subprime mortgage market. It is important to note that the direction of this variable is inconsistent,
suggesting that the relationship between percentage of minority population and probability of
receiving a subprime loan may be based on other local characteristics. This variable may be picking
up variations in affluence amongst minorities in various states, for example.
140. See infra Table 4.
141. See infra Table 1 (percentage of loan applicants accepted at HUD-Classified Subprime
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the loan amount and the likelihood that a borrower receives a subprime loan
could be capturing wealthier borrowers with positive borrower characteristics
who are applying for and receiving larger loans at prime loan rates.
The median income of the MSA has a similar directionality; as the income
of the borrower increases, the likelihood of receiving a subprime loan
decreases.142 This finding reinforces the explanation for the inverse
relationship between the loan amount and the probability of receiving a
subprime loan.
Table 4 analyzes the effect of the primary independent variable (race of
the applicant) and the secondary independent variables143 on the probability
that an individual will receive a subprime loan, as defined by the Alternative
Measure. Massachusetts will be used in this discussion to illustrate the data.
As with the HUD-Classified Subprime Lenders, the applicant‘s race (being
black versus being white) has a statistically and substantively significant
effect on the probability that a borrower will obtain a loan from a subprime
lender. This variable has a coefficient of 0.401, which can be interpreted as a
log-odds ratio.144 Calculated as a change in the probability of receiving a
subprime loan, borrowers, if all other variables are held at their mean, see a
3.3-percentage-point increase in the probability of receiving a subprime loan.
While this may appear low, it is important to remember that, as displayed in
Table 1, only 11.4% of white borrowers receive subprime loans. Thus, an
increase in probability of 3.3 percentage points is more than a 25% increase in
the probability that an individual receives a subprime loan, simply based on
that individual‘s race.
Table 5 reveals similar patterns: blacks are more likely than whites to be
accepted for a loan from a HUD-Classified Subprime Lender. Here, again,
race has a positive effect and is statistically significant, meaning that black
applicants are more likely to be approved for a loan from a subprime lender
than are white applicants when income, house values, median income,
percentage of owner-occupied homes, percentage of the census tract that are
minorities, and MSA median income are held constant. The effect size ranges
from 0.232 to 1.067. As with the Alternative Measure of subprime loans, the
amount of the loan, the percentage of owner-occupied housing, the income of
Lenders compared to the percentage of loans classified by the Alternative Measure).
142. See infra Table 4 (median income of MSA). For example, in Alaska, the median income
of the MSA has a significant, negative effect on the probability that a borrower will receive a
subprime loan, as defined by the Alternative Measure. The effect is -0.003, or a $1,000 increase in
the median income of the MSA decreases the odds of getting a subprime loan by three tenths of
one percent.
143. These variables are loan amount, borrower income, HUD income, median income for the
MSA, percentage of owner-occupied housing, and the minority composition of the census tract.
144. See infra p. 937.
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the borrower, and the HUD median family income have very small effect
sizes and are routinely significant.
Interestingly, the effect size on the amount of the loan is positive (but
small in size), suggesting that as the size of the loan goes up, borrowers are
more likely to go to a HUD-Classified Subprime Lender. This is in contrast
to the results for the Alternative Measure of subprime lenders.145 This
difference suggests that these two measures are capturing varying borrower
and lender behavior, particularly among those applying for larger loans. As
stated earlier, the finding that an increase in the loan amount leads to a lower
probability of receiving a subprime rate (the Alternative Measure) could
reflect other positive borrower characteristics such as stable credit history,
low income-to-debt ratio, high credit scores, and substantial down
payments.146 However, the positive relationship between loan amount and
borrowing from a HUD-Classified Subprime Lender suggests that those
borrowing at higher loan amounts may seek out subprime lenders who are
willing to make larger and potentially riskier loans. It may also be that these
borrowers receive a prime rate from a subprime lender. The median income
of the MSA has a negative effect, while the percentage of the population that
is minority has, again, an inconsistent effect.
It is helpful to continue to use Massachusetts as an example for purposes of
analyzing the data contained in Tables 4 and 5. Table 5 allows one to estimate
the probability that a borrower will receive a subprime loan (versus a prime
loan) through logistical regression analysis, using the HUD-Classified
Subprime Lender measure. In Massachusetts, all the control variables are
significant, suggesting that neighborhood characteristics, borrower
characteristics, and borrower race are all indicators of whether an applicant
receives a subprime loan. Looking across the data, the first variable is black,
which is a dummy variable representing the borrower‘s race. A ―0‖ indicates
that the applicant is white, while a ―1‖ indicates that the applicant is black.
This variable is significant, and its impact is fairly large. Logistical regression
requires that one be very careful in interpreting the substantive effects of these
results. Dummy variable coefficients in logistical regression should be
interpreted as log-odds ratios, or the ratio of the odds of receiving the subprime
loan (versus receiving the prime loan) between the two groups (blacks and
whites). Here, being black (versus white) means that a borrower has a tenpercentage-point greater likelihood of receiving a subprime loan. The amount
of the loan is positive, suggesting that as the amount requested increases, so
too does the likelihood of receiving a subprime loan. The minority population
variable is positive, meaning that as the percentage of the minority population
145. See supra notes 140–41.
146. See supra note 77.
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increases, so too does the probability of receiving a subprime loan. The
substantive effect of the minority population variable is that for every
percentage-point increase in the minority population in the census tract, the
probability of receiving a subprime loan increases by one-half of a percentage
point. The median income of the MSA is negative, meaning that an inverse
relationship exists—an increase in the median income of the MSA leads to a
decrease in the probability of receiving a subprime loan.147 The income of the
individual is also negative, suggesting that as the applicant‘s income increases,
the likelihood of receiving a subprime loan goes down.148
The control data from 1998 and 2002 is presented in Table 6.
Additionally, Table 6 contains a composite of the data from Table 5 for
purposes of comparing the data for these three years, particularly examining
the impact of race on the same variable over time (HUD-Classified Subprime
Lender).149 The race of the borrower is statistically significant and positive,
indicating that black borrowers are more likely to receive subprime loans than
white borrowers. The loan amount, median income of the census tract, and
percentage of housing that is owner-occupied all have negative coefficients,
indicating that these variables cause the probability of receiving a loan from a
subprime lender to decrease. The HUD income variable is insignificant in
2002, and is marginally negative150 in 1998. Income is significant and
negative, indicating that as the income of the applicant rises, the probability of
receiving a subprime loan decreases. For all the variables, the relationship
between neighborhood and objective borrower characteristics and the
probability of receiving a loan from a HUD-Classified Subprime Lender
decreased in substantive effect from 1998 to 2002, while the effect of race
rose in substantive effect.
Statistics can never prove intent; intent reflects an actor‘s state of mind.
All statistics can do, at most, is reveal overall patterns and demonstrate
relationships between, in this case, borrower characteristics and lending and
borrowing behavior. However, in this case, statistical analysis has shown that
many of the traditional explanations for placing a borrower in a subprime loan
are either (1) not statistically significant or (2) insufficient in explaining the

147. The substantive effect of this variable is reasonably large, with an odds ratio of just over 1%.
148. The HUD income is also significant, although there is very little substantive effect, with a
coefficient near zero. The percentage of housing in the census tract that is owner-occupied is
significant, with a coefficient also near zero.
149. As with Tables 2 and 3, I combined the state-by-state effects into a single, national model,
which allowed me to evaluate the changes in effect over time. In addition, many of the states with
very low black populations did not have enough observations to permit logit analysis. By combining
the states and using state fixed effects (inserting a dummy variable for each state), I was able to
evaluate the effect of race on subprime lending.
150. The variable is statistically significant but the effect size is substantively insignificant.
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disparate rate of subprime lending to black and white borrowers. When the
reasons for placing a borrower in a subprime loan were controlled (like
borrower income, cost of the loan, and neighborhood characteristics), race
continued to be significant. That is, being a black borrower consistently
resulted in a higher probability of receiving a loan from a subprime lender,
regardless of the borrower‘s income or where the house was located.151
Analyzing Table 6 in depth, it is clear that, first, the baseline152 has been
growing in size (becoming less negative) since 1998. This indicates that the
overall probability of receiving a loan from a subprime lender has grown since
1998.153 Looking generally at the results, Table 6 shows that neighborhood
and house characteristics (including median income of the MSA, percentage
of owner-occupied housing and HUD income) all have declined in their
substantive effect on the probability of receiving a loan from a subprime
lender. Essentially, those who argue that subprime loans are going primarily
to bad neighborhoods may have been right at some point, but their argument
grows weaker over time, as we move toward 2006. Next, looking at borrower
characteristics, the study shows that both the loan amount and the borrower‘s
income have also declined in substantive effect from 1998 to 2002 to 2006;
however, the substantive effect of the borrower‘s race grew (in each of the
years 1998, 2002, and 2006), suggesting that black borrowers are bearing the
true brunt of the subprime market. Taken together, this suggests that at the
beginning of the subprime lending crisis, subprime lenders focused on
relevant borrower and property characteristics.154 Over time, lenders focused
less on these legitimate characteristics and instead focused more on the race of
the borrower.
V. THE IMPACT OF RACE: EVIDENCE OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATORY
TREATMENT
In fashioning a solution or response to the dilemma currently faced by
many black borrowers, it is important to discern the source of the
discrimination. The legal and policy response to unconscious discrimination
by lenders against black borrowers might, and arguably ought to, be different
from the legal and policy response to conscious and targeted discrimination.

151. See infra Table 6.
152. See id. (column labeled ―Constant‖).
153. In 1998, the log odds that a borrower would receive a subprime loan from a subprime
lender was -234%. In 2002, the log odds increased to -189% and increased again to -65% in 2006.
Essentially, this means that a borrower, starting off, regardless of borrower or property
characteristics, was much more likely to receive a loan from a subprime lender in 2006 than in 1998
or 2002.
154. Such characteristics include loan amount, borrower income, median income of the MSA,
and percentage of owner-occupied housing in the census tract.
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A failure to accurately identify the nature of the discrimination that black
borrowers face in the home mortgage and refinance markets could condemn
black borrowers to re-experience this current housing predicament, or a
closely analogous one, across time and across products.
As housing law advocates and scholars know, demonstrating
discriminatory intent in this area of the law can be quite challenging.155 Direct
evidence of housing discrimination is rare and corroboration is even more
difficult to establish.156 The difficulty in proving intentional discrimination
makes the conduct enticing and difficult to eliminate and creates a perfect
breeding ground for the misconduct. The challenge with using direct
examples of discriminatory intent is that without extremely large volumes of
such evidence, what might appear collectively to be market-wide race
discrimination could reflect only the isolated actions of a very few brokers or
lenders who are active in the market of black borrowers. The challenge in
proving that the overrepresentation of black borrowers in the subprime and
predatory markets results from intentional discrimination does not mean that
intentional discrimination is not in fact the cause. Discrimination based in
prejudice has always been challenging to establish, but the importance of
doing so from a remedial and accountability standpoint necessitates that one
not be timid in addressing the issue.
Disparate impact evidence alone and in isolated instances is not sufficient
to establish a strong correlation to discriminatory intent. The overwhelming
representation of blacks in the subprime market compared to similarly situated
white borrowers—after comparing borrowers with equivalent credit
indicators, and in the absence of any explanation other than race—should be
sufficient to establish a cognizable claim of targeting and of intentional
discrimination.157 Certainly, evidence of discriminatory intent is helpful in
making the case and this evidence is available, though not in the same
abundance as statistical evidence of disparate impact. Making the case for the
impact of race across many financial institutions approaches the impossible

155. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21
(1977) (argued pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment):
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially
discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the
challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village
the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had
the impermissible purpose not been considered.
Id.
156. Stanley D. Longhofer, Cultural Affinity and Mortgage Discrimination, 32 FED. RES.
BANK OF CLEV. ECON. REV. 12, 16 (1996), available at http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1996/96-q3-longhofer.pdf.
157. See supra Part IV.
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unless one is willing to accept not only direct evidence in the form of affidavit
statements, express market materials, and other forms of confession, but also
the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from quality data, national and
local, pertaining to the subject.
Gail Kubiniec, a former CitiFinancial loan officer testified about her
subprime mortgage marketing practices. ―‗If someone appeared uneducated,
inarticulate, was a minority, or was particularly old or young, I would try to
include all the [insurance] coverages CitiFinancial offered.‘‖158 CitiFinancial
is a part of Citigroup Inc. In response to criticism about its lending practices,
Citigroup agreed to send out minority and non-minority auditors posing as
CitiFinancial customers to its consumer finance branches from December
2000 through January 2001 to evaluate their fair lending compliance
practices. The effectiveness of the ―Mystery Shopper‖ program was criticized
under allegations that Citigroup sent a memorandum to certain CitiFinancial
branches and districts providing advance notice of the tests.159
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in McGlawn v. Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission160 affirmed a finding of reverse redlining by the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (the Commission) against
McGlawn and McGlawn (McGlawn), a black-owned mortgage broker
company. To establish a claim of reverse redlining, the plaintiffs first bore
the burden of demonstrating that the loan terms and lending practices of the
defendant were unfair and predatory.161 Second, the plaintiffs had to
demonstrate that the defendants intentionally targeted them based upon their
race or that they experienced a disparate impact, again based upon their
race.162
The plaintiffs, also black, alleged that McGlawn discriminated against
them because of their race and because of the racial composition of their
predominantly black neighborhoods. The Commission, in reaching its
determination on the first element that the loan terms were unfair and
predatory, relied in part upon expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs ―that,
even assuming a borrower is an enhanced credit risk, the difference in interest
rates between a sub-prime and prime market loan is usually no greater than
three percentage points. Anything higher than a three-point difference is

158. Paul Beckett, Citigroup’s ―Subprime‖ Reforms Questioned, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2002, at
C1 (alteration in original); see also Austin, supra note 5, at 1219 (delineating women, the elderly, the
poor and minorities as examples of consumers targeted by predatory lenders because of their
perceived vulnerabilities).
159. Citigroup Inc., 88 Fed. Res. Bull. 485, 497 n.70 (2002); Beckett, supra note 158.
160. 891 A.2d 757 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006), appeal denied, 906 A.2d 545 (Pa. 2006).
161. Id. at 767.
162. Id. at 772.
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indicative of a predatory loan.‖163 The expert likely relied upon the HMDA
definition of higher priced loans in reaching its conclusion. ―Under HMDA, a
loan is deemed to be higher-cost if the annual percentage rate exceeds the rate
on the treasury security of corresponding maturity by 3% for a first
lien . . . .‖164
Next, the Commission found, and the court affirmed, that McGlawn
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs.165 The Commission also
found substantial statistical evidence of disparate impact, which the court
affirmed.166 According to the Commission, McGlawn ―engaged in an
aggressive marketing plan targeting [blacks] and [black] neighborhoods in the
Philadelphia area.‖167 McGlawn admitted to advertising extensively in print,
radio, and television media and that many of the sources in which it chose to
advertise were ―oriented toward [black] audiences and readers.‖168 The
plaintiffs testified that they contacted the defendant because of its
advertisements and that their decision to contact the defendant ―was
influenced by the fact that it was [a black] company.‖169 Part of McGlawn‘s
advertising strategy was to market itself as one of Philadelphia‘s ―‗first
[black] owned and operated Mortgage and Insurance Financial Services
[companies].‘‖170 Essentially, McGlawn emphasized its cultural affinity with
the black borrowers it targeted and, at least in this instance, benefited from
that affinity.171
Relatedly, the court in M & T Mortgage Corp. v. Foy172 held that a
rebuttable presumption of illegal and discriminatory loan practice arises when
a lender grants a mortgage to a minority borrower to purchase property in a
minority area if the loan‘s interest rate exceeds three percentage points above
the comparable Treasury rate. The plaintiff sued to foreclose its mortgage;
the court found that the defendant, a black woman, may have been a victim of
reverse redlining, and after finding that the interest rate on the defendant‘s
mortgage was in excess of 3% above the comparable reasury rate, the court
163. Id. at 770 (internal citation omitted).
164. Subprime Mortgages and Foreclosures in New York: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Banks, N.Y. State Senate, 2007 Leg. (N.Y. 2007) (statement of Richard H. Neiman, Superintendent
of Banks, N.Y. State Banking Department), available at http://www.banking.state.ny.us/
sp071213.htm.
165. McGlawn, 891 A.2d at 773.
166. Id. at 772–73.
167. Id. at 764.
168. Id. at 772.
169. Id. at 773.
170. Id. at 772.
171. See infra Part VI (discussing cultural affinity).
172. 858 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (relying on the HMDA definition of a higher
priced loan).
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held that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving that the loan was not ―the
product of discriminatory practices.‖173
In 2006, HUD conciliated a case in which a black couple filed a complaint
against First Franklin Financial Bank and Primary Residential Mortgage.174
The complainants alleged that though they attempted to purchase a home with
a fixed-rate mortgage, the lender, because of their race, switched the mortgage
loan to an adjustable rate mortgage containing a prepayment penalty and that
the lender also added an additional $4,000 in closing costs. The parties
entered into a voluntary conciliation agreement.175 The lender paid the
complainants $4,000, waived both the closing costs and the prepayment
penalty, and provided a new fixed-rate mortgage.176 The lender also agreed to
implement Fair Housing Act training for its employees and to prominently
display the fair housing logo in its marketing and advertising materials.177
On June 3, 2008, the Massachusetts Attorney General filed a lawsuit
against subprime lender Option One Mortgage Corp. (Option One) and its
parent H&R Block, Inc. (H&R Block) (collectively HRB Entities). The suit
alleges that HRB Entities steered prime mortgage borrowers to subprime
loans, that HRB Entities engaged in predatory lending,178 and that it
produced and distributed to its employees, loan officers, and
brokers written marketing and educational materials
explaining that the limited choices available to black and

173. Id. at 569.
174. Rooting Out Discrimination in Mortgage Lending: Using HMDA as a Tool for Fair
Lending Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 140 (2007) [hereinafter Rooting Out Discrimination] (written
statement of Kim Kendrick, Assistant Sec‘y for Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, U.S. Dep‘t of
Hous. & Urban Dev.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
110_house_hearings&docid=f:38394.pdf.
175. Id. Conciliation agreements may provide less probative evidence of intentional
discrimination. Parties may choose to enter into these voluntary agreements for myriad reasons
unassociated with the truth of the underlying complaint. As an example, lenders may find the costs
associated with litigation to outweigh the benefits of private conciliation agreements.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Complaint ¶¶ 11, 16, 31–80, 152, Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 08-2474-BLS
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 3, 2008), available at http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/press/
2008_06_03_option_one_suit_attachment1.pdf. In a subsequent memorandum decision, the court
dismissed some of the Commonwealth‘s claims but allowed others to proceed to trial.
Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 08-2474-BLS-1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2008) (mem.),
available at http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/press/2008_11_12_option_one_pi_attachment1.pdf.
According to the Massachusetts attorney general‘s office, the case is expected to proceed to trial
sometime in 2010. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of Mass., Attorney General Coakley‘s
Office Reaches Affordable Loan Modification and Foreclosure Prevention Agreement with Mortgage
Servicer (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=cagopressrelease&L=1&L0=Home&sid=
Cago&b=pressrelease&f=2009_11_10_ahmsi_agreement&csid=Cago.
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Latino borrowers made them good candidates for the HRB
Entities‘ subprime loan products and that loan originators
should focus on the ―emerging markets‖ of black and Latino
homebuyers.179
HRB Entities is also accused of charging black and Latinos more points
and higher fees under its discretionary pricing policy even when they were
similarly situated to white HRB Entities borrowers.180
On January 8, 2008, the City of Baltimore filed suit against Wells Fargo
in the federal district court of Maryland alleging reverse redlining. 181 In
addition to HMDA statistics revealing disparate impact based upon race in
Wells Fargo‘s lending practices, the complaint also alleged that Wells Fargo‘s
loan ―pricing sheets require that equally credit worthy borrowers in
predominantly [black] neighborhoods pay higher interest rates compared to
their counterparts in white neighborhoods.‖182 The City of Baltimore filed an
amended complaint on June 1, 2009.183 The allegations of reverse redlining
and other forms of racial discrimination in lending were supported, in part, by
declarations of former employees who described various practices and
techniques that were designed to steer black borrowers into subprime loans.
Elizabeth M. Jacobson worked for Wells Fargo for nearly nine years, first
as a loan officer and later as a sales manager.184 For much of her career at
Wells Fargo, she specialized in the subprime loan business.185 Ms. Jacobson
described a practice pursuant to which loan officers specializing in prime
loans used their discretion or falsified loan applications for the purpose of
179. Complaint ¶ 120, H&R Block, Inc., No. 08-2474-BLS; see APGAR ET AL., supra note 29,
at 64 (―Predatory practices not only include outright deception and fraud, but also efforts to
manipulate the borrower through aggressive sales tactics or to exploit their lack of understanding
about loan terms.‖).
180. Complaint ¶ 14, H&R Block, Inc., No. 08-2474-BLS.
181. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages ¶ 6, Mayor of Baltimore v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:08-cv-00062-BEL (D. Md. Jan. 8, 2008). On January 6, 2010, the
district court granted Wells Fargo‘s motion to dismiss the city‘s complaint for lack of standing with
leave to file a more limited complaint before February 3, 2010. The court found that there was an
insufficient causal connection between Wells Fargo‘s alleged misconduct and the city‘s claimed
damages. Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM 1:08 CV-00062 (D. Md. Jan. 6,
2010).
182. Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act of 1968: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 55 (2008)
(written statement of Suzanne Sangree, Chief Solicitor, Baltimore City Law Department), available
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/42850.PDF; see also First Amended Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages ¶¶ 72–78, 91–94, Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:08-cv-00062-BEL (D. Md. June 1, 2009), dismissed by No. JFM 1:08 CV00062 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 2010).
183. First Amended Complaint at 60, Mayor of Baltimore, No. 1:08-cv-00062-BEL.
184. Declaration of Elizabeth M. Jacobson ¶¶ 2–3, id.
185. Id. ¶¶ 3–7.
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steering certain of their prime loan customers to her for subprime loans.186
Some of these borrowers ―could have qualified for a prime loan‖187 while
others were ineligible and should not have received any type of loan.188
Ms. Jacobson stated that a significant majority of her customers were black
and that the company‘s ―Emerging Markets unit specifically targeted black
churches‖189 while white churches were not marketed to nor were they
targeted by subprime loan officers.190 If what Ms. Jacobson says is to be
believed and if Wells Fargo‘s culture focused ―solely on making as much
money as possible[,]‖191 one might inquire why Wells Fargo‘s loan officers
targeted black borrowers (even those who qualified for prime loans) and black
churches for subprime loans instead of focusing indiscriminately on
borrowers and churches of all colors and makeups. Possible answers to this
inquiry are developed in Part VI.
Tony Paschal worked as a loan officer or mortgage consultant for Wells
Fargo for eight years between 1997 and 2007.192 He stated that Wells Fargo
targeted blacks for subprime loans by special marketing to black communities
and by using black subprime loans officers to market to black communities.193
―For example, if a Wells Fargo loan officer anywhere in the United States
wanted to send a flyer to consumers in [a black] neighborhood soliciting
subprime loans, he could access software on his computer that would print out
a flyer to persons speaking the language of ‗African American.‘‖194 Wells
Fargo maintained an ―Affinity Group Marketing section‖195 that consisted
exclusively of black employees, and the Affinity Group targeted black
churches and their members for subprime loans.196 According to Mr. Paschal,
loan officers ―regularly originated subprime loans to [blacks] . . . who could
have qualified for a lower cost prime loan or FHA loan.‖197
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) conducted a

186. Id. ¶ 18. Wells Fargo‘s commission system ―made it more profitable for a loan officer to
refer a prime customer for a subprime loan than make the prime loan directly to the customer.‖
Id. ¶ 8.
187. Id. ¶ 17.
188. Id. ¶ 18.
189. Id. ¶ 27.
190. Id. ¶ 30.
191. Id. ¶ 32.
192. Declaration of Tony Paschal ¶ 2, Mayor of Baltimore, No. 1:08-cv-00062-BEL.
193. Id. ¶¶ 10–13.
194. Id. ¶ 11.
195. Id. ¶ 12; see also infra Part VI (discussing cultural affinity).
196. Declaration of Tony Paschal ¶ 12, Mayor of Baltimore, No. 1:08-cv-00062-BEL.
197. Id.; see also id. ¶¶ 13–14 (containing additional allegations of discrimination against black
borrowers).
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mystery shopping initiative between February 2004 and June 2006.198 The
NCRC visited mortgage brokers and conducted 106 ―mystery shops‖ in
Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; Houston, Texas;
Los Angeles, California; St. Louis, Missouri; and Washington, D.C.199 The
NCRC sent auditors, mystery shoppers, with similar credit histories and
incomes but of different ethnicities and races to contact and meet with lenders
to discuss their mortgage products.200 In fact, the protected class auditors
―were actually given more attractive profiles in terms of their amount of
equity, credit standing and employment tenure, and should have logically
received better treatment.‖201 The control group consisted of white auditors,
and the protected group was comprised of black and Hispanic auditors. The
NCRC audit resulted in the following findings. Lenders discussed fees with
30% of the protected group and with 74% of the control group.202 Mortgage
brokers provided twice as many rate quotes to the control group as to the
protected group so that the control group received the benefit of more credit
products.203 Control group auditors were referred to banks 16% of the time
while only 8% of the time were protected group auditors referred to banks,
where presumably they could get a better rate.204 Seven percent of the time,
the control group was ―referred up‖ (i.e., told they could obtain a better rate
elsewhere), while the protected group was never referred up for a better
rate.205 During the interview, brokers asked protected group auditors 40% of
the time if they had prior foreclosures, debts, late payments, or poor credit;
only 9% of the control group auditors were asked similar questions.206 The
NCRC audit shows that even though the financial profiles of the members of
the protected group were superior to those of the control group, blacks posing
as borrowers received significantly worse treatment and were offered less
information and costlier terms than whites.
198. Building Sustainable Homeownership: Responsible Lending and Informed Consumer
Choice: Hearing Before the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 88–89 (2006) (testimony of
David Berenbaum, Executive Vice President, National Community Reinvestment Coalition)
[hereinafter
Building
Sustainable
Homeownership],
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/publichearings/hoepa/2006/20060609/transcript.pdf.
199. Rooting Out Discrimination, supra note 174, at 268 (testimony of John Taylor, President
and CEO, National Community Reinvestment Coalition).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Building Sustainable Homeownership, supra note 198, at 89. Elsewhere, National
Community Reinvestment Coalition president and CEO John Taylor asserted that lenders discussed
fees with white testers 62% of the time and with blacks only 35% of the time. Rooting Out
Discrimination, supra note 174, at 268.
203. Sustainable Homeownership, supra note 198, at 89.
204. Id. at 90.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 90–91.
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Previous auditing by the NCRC of twelve major subprime lenders in
Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles,
California, New York, New York; and Washington, D.C., between May and
September 2003 revealed similar results.207
Forty-eight audits were
208
conducted.
Auditors were given substantially similar profiles; however,
black auditors were given profiles that would make them appear more
qualified than white auditors. Black auditors had higher income, better ratios,
longer job histories, longer duration in their homes, and higher credit
scores.209 All of the testing was preapplication; when questioned by the
lenders about their credit scores, black auditors reported their FICO score as
690 and white auditors reported theirs as 675.210 Both black and white
auditors were given profiles that would qualify them for prime loans.211
The audits were analyzed to determine any differences in treatment
received by the white auditors and the black auditors. The NCRC concluded
that 45% of the time, black auditors received less favorable treatment than
white auditors.212 White auditors were more often referred up the prime
lending division; they were given more detailed information and quoted lower
interest rates or ranges of rates.213
White auditors received more
recommendations, advice, follow-up, and more time with the loan officers.214
White and black auditors received different literature and materials and
different information regarding interest rates, loan terms, loan programs, fees,
required ratios, and qualification standards.215 In some instances, loan officers
gave white auditors loan quotes based upon the information provided by the
white auditors, but refused to provide interest rate quotes to black auditors
without a credit check or credit report.216
The NCRC audits and the other studies mentioned strongly rebut claims
by lenders and others that differences in lending patterns between blacks and
whites are explained solely or primarily by risk characteristics such as the
borrowers‘ credit scores. After controlling for the borrower‘s credit and for
legitimate, individual borrower qualification criteria, one might reasonably
question whether blacks ―are being discriminated against in the marketplace
207. Memorandum from Nat‘l Cmty. Reinv. Coal., Sub-Prime Fair Lending ―Mystery
Shopping‖ Update (July 21, 2008) (on file with author).
208. Id. at 2.
209. Id. at 3.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 5.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 7–8.
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and being forced to pay a ‗race tax‘ due to unequal access to credit.‖217
VI. THE SEARCH FOR ANSWERS: CULTURAL AFFINITY AND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF THE MINORITY
The subprime market mushroomed, partly in response to the narrow profit
margins in the prime market and partly in response to demands for higher
returns.218 By 2000, Wall Street investment banks were demanding subprime
loans, which they purchased and bundled into mortgage-backed securities and
sold. Securitization of credit, also known as asset securitization, is a financial
term that describes the process of packaging, underwriting, and selling
mortgage loans and mortgage refinances.219 Any asset that produces an
income stream can be securitized—automobile loans, utility accounts, credit
card balances, or mortgages, for example. Securitized mortgages are
marketed as mortgage-backed securities and then sold to individuals and
institutional investors. The efficiencies of securitization grew rapidly in the
prime market. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the largest and second-largest
providers of capital for home loans in the United States, respectively,
competed for prime loans from banks, resulting in a diminution in the profit
margins for prime mortgage-backed securities.220
A central assumption of this Article is that mortgage lenders are highly
competitive and that their primary motivation is to make money and
maximize profits.221 An important conceptual distinction to address is
whether lenders can be labeled as engaging in intentional discrimination if
their motivation is to increase profits or ―whether prejudice must be put ahead

217. Rooting Out Discrimination, supra note 174, at 269 (testimony of John Taylor, President
and CEO, National Community Reinvestment Coalition).
218. Subprime borrowers are charged higher interest rates because they are perceived to be
greater credit risks. Those who invested in securities based upon subprime mortgages received
higher returns compared to securities based upon prime mortgages. Alec Klein & Zachary A.
Goldfarb, The Bubble: How Homeowners, Speculators and Wall Street Dealmakers Rode a Wave of
Easy Money with Crippling Consequences, WASH. POST, June 15, 2008, at A1.
219. For a general description of the effects of securitization on the housing market, see
Kathleen Day, Villains in the Mortgage Mess? Start at Wall Street. Keep Going., WASH. POST, June
1, 2008, at B1.
220. Jody Shenn, U.S. Home-Loan Giants Weathering the Crisis? Subprime Exposure Is Big
but High-Grade, INT‘L HERALD TRIB. (Paris, Fr.), July 30, 2007, at 12. ―Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, created by Congress to increase mortgage financing, own or guarantee about 40 percent of U.S.
home loan debt. They make money by investing in mortgages and related bonds and from fees for
guaranteeing repayment on securities created out of loans from primary lenders.‖ Id.; Day, supra
note 219.
221. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16 (2d ed. 1971) (discussing
a contrary assumption); Longhofer, supra note 156, at 13 (―Translated to the mortgage market, this
means that rather than being ‗profit maximizers,‘ bigoted lenders are ‗utility maximizers‘ who are
willing to sacrifice profits in order to satisfy their ‗tastes for discrimination.‘‖).
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of profits for behavior to be labeled as discriminatory.‖222
Nobel Laureate Gary Becker developed the theory of taste-based
discrimination.223 According to Becker‘s theory:
Money, commonly used as a measuring rod, will also
serve as a measure of discrimination. If an individual has a
―taste for discrimination,‖ he must act as if he were willing to
pay something, either directly or in the form of a reduced
income, to be associated with some persons instead of others.
When actual discrimination occurs, he must, in fact, either
pay or forfeit income for this privilege. This simple way of
looking at the matter gets at the essence of prejudice and
discrimination.224
Becker also distinguishes between discrimination grounded in prejudice
and discrimination grounded in economic efficiency, the former being the
more pernicious as prejudice reflects preference and is independent of
knowledge, while perceptions of the most economically efficient choice can
be changed by the dissemination of accurate information.225
A lender may target black borrowers for subprime loans because the
lender is prejudiced; alternatively, the lender may underestimate the economic
efficiency or value of the borrower or, the corollary, the lender may
overestimate the risk of lending to black borrowers and therefore target these
borrowers for subprime loans.226
―Since a taste for discrimination
incorporates both prejudice and ignorance, the amount of knowledge available
must be included as a determinant of tastes.‖227 Even in the face of a lot of
knowledge about black borrowers (objective signals),228 prejudiced lenders
may choose to discriminate by offering loans on terms that are less attractive
than what the objective signals indicate the black borrowers should receive.
Such a decision might indicate that ignorance about black borrowers is
secondary to lenders‘ prejudice and would weaken an assumption that the
solution to the current dilemma this Article addresses is the ―wholesale spread
222. Ladd, supra note 69, at 42.
223. BECKER, supra note 221, at 16.
224. Id. at 14.
225. Id. at 16.
226. See id.; Austin, supra note 5, at 1250. Austin observes that blacks are generally associated
with a cash economy and are stereotyped as ―‗wasteful consumers.‘‖ Austin, supra note 5, at 1250
(citation omitted). As a result, they ―are . . . assumed not to know the value of money or how to deal
with financial matters in a knowledgeable way.‖ Id.; see APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 28
(―[T]oday‘s dual mortgage market fails to achieve what economists term ‗allocational efficiency‘
because similarly situated borrowers pay different prices to obtain a mortgage of given characteristics
and terms.‖).
227. BECKER, supra note 221, at 17.
228. See infra notes 245–58 and accompanying text.
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of knowledge.‖229
If, by definition, individuals with a taste for discrimination will behave as
though they are prepared to forfeit income for the actual privilege of
discriminating,230 and if Becker‘s theory is applied in the context of the
mortgage market, then lenders with a taste for discrimination should be
willing to forgo profit for the privilege of discriminating. Following Becker‘s
theory, one might contend that some actions by lenders that would, according
to law, be interpreted as discriminatory treatment of black borrowers, actually
do not result from lender prejudice because the lenders were aiming to
maximize profits.231 Adherents to this view of discrimination would be
willing to conclude that lenders were intentionally discriminating based upon
illegal prejudice if provided with knowledge in the form of ―evidence that the
group receiving the differentially adverse treatment imposes credit risks that
on average are no higher than those imposed by other groups of borrowers.‖232
In contrast to the taste-based theory of discrimination, adverse treatment
of black borrowers may be the result of statistical discrimination—
discrimination that lenders engage in because it is more cost-efficient
(cheaper) to use borrowers‘ group status, such as race or gender, to project
their creditworthiness than it is to use borrowers‘ individual past history.233
The statistical definition of discrimination is broader than that captured by the
taste-based theory and more reflective of the content of anti-discrimination
laws governing lending and housing.234 ―The legal definition of racial
discrimination does not presume that lenders are foregoing profits to exercise
prejudice against the protected group. Hence, illegal discrimination need not
be uneconomic in the sense that it reduces profits.‖235
The definition of discrimination used here—identifying an emerging
market of borrowers, black borrowers, and intentionally targeting them to
receive less attractive loan products than similarly situated white borrowers—
is broader than the definition of discrimination offered by Becker. This
broader definition anticipates lenders attempting to capture greater gains, the
contrary of forgoing profits, by trading upon their assumption about black
borrowers based upon their group status. It more closely reflects the legal
definition of discrimination in housing and mortgage law.
229. BECKER, supra note 221, at 17.
230. Id. at 14.
231. See id.; Ladd, supra note 69, at 42.
232. Ladd, supra note 69, at 42.
233. Id.
234. See supra notes 48, 59–60 and accompanying text.
235. Ladd, supra note 69, at 43; see, e.g., supra notes 57–60 (discussing the Federal Fair
Housing Act of 1968 (as amended), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977, and their anti-discrimination provisions).
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If one accepts the assumption that lenders are motivated by profit,
predominantly if not exclusively, what explains the persistence of intentional
lending discrimination in the mortgage industry, a highly competitive market?
One popular theory of the source of discrimination in mortgage lending is the
cultural affinity hypothesis, first proposed by Charles W. Calomiris,
Charles M. Kahn, and Stanley D. Longhofer in their article Housing-Finance
Intervention and Private Incentives: Helping Minorities and the Poor.236
According to the cultural affinity hypothesis, lenders discriminate against
borrowers with whom they do not have a cultural affinity or experiential
background because they find it more difficult, specifically more costly, to
evaluate these borrowers‘ creditworthiness when compared to borrowers with
whom they share the same cultural affinity.237 Lenders find it less costeffective to invest in gathering information about black borrowers either
because the expected benefits of investing in this additional information are
lower for these groups than for whites238 or because the lender perceives that
it is simply more expensive to gather information about black borrowers than
white borrowers.239 As a result, Calomiris et al. argue that, because it is easier
and less costly to evaluate borrowers with whom lenders, who are mostly nonminority, share a cultural affinity, lenders will tend to discriminate against
minority borrowers.240
The cultural affinity hypothesis has most often been used to explain
mortgage market discrimination focusing on denial rates.241 In this Article, I
extend the hypothesis to consider how problems of cultural affinity might
affect loan terms. Additionally, I argue that, consistent with the new iteration
of housing discrimination that is besetting the mortgage and housing markets,
―cultural affinity‖ has grown to take on new meaning. Traditionally, the
cultural affinity hypothesis was used to explain disparities in loan denial rates
between whites and blacks based upon whether the lender and the borrower
shared the same race or cultural affinity.242 The cultural affinity hypothesis
applies in other contexts as well and helps provide insights on mortgage
discrimination in additional contexts such as situations in which the borrower

236. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 635.
237. Id. at 650.
238. One explanation is that, on average, they are poorer than whites. Id.
239. Id.; see also Austin, supra note 5, at 1218. Austin argues that ―black people‘s money is
literally a distinctive currency worth less than white people‘s money, both socially and materially.‖
Austin, supra note 5, at 1218. Lenders adopting this position would find it comparatively more
expensive to lend to blacks than whites. Id. at 1251.
240. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 650; see also Longhofer, supra note 156, at 13.
241. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 635; Hunter & Walker, supra note 19; Longhofer, supra
note 156, at 12.
242. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 635.
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and lender are of the same race. Thus, I extend the definition of cultural
affinity to include black lenders and brokers whose actual or self-perceived
cultural affinity and experiential backgrounds are more closely aligned with
white borrowers.
The essence of the cultural affinity hypothesis is uncertainty—because the
lender is uncertain about lending money to groups outside of the lender‘s race,
lenders will perceive the credit indicators of these groups as unreliable, even
when the indicators of an individual group member exceed the lender‘s
requirements. As a result of this perception of unreliability, lenders will tend
to discriminate against black borrowers, not only in their acceptance and
denial rates, but in the quality of loans offered to these borrowers. Old forms
of housing and lending discrimination facilitated this uncertainty by denying
black borrowers traditional access to credit.243
Cultural affinity
institutionalizes the uncertainty about certain borrowers based upon race and
even rationalizes discrimination against these individuals.244
Stanley Longhofer, one of the original proponents of the cultural affinity
hypothesis, considers the distorting effect of the secondary market on cultural
affinity in the home mortgage market. He begins with a series of
propositions. First, lenders receive ―objective signals‖ about a borrower‘s
creditworthiness, such as FICO scores, credit history, employment, income,
and obligation ratios, that are objectively observable by outsiders.245
Objective signals are derived from the information lenders collect as part of
the loan evaluation process and which lenders believe allow them to infer the
likelihood of a borrower‘s default.246 Lenders receive objective signals from
minority and non-minority borrowers.
Second, lenders also receive private, ―subjective signals,‖ but only for the
group with which they have a cultural affinity; Longhofer assumes this would
be the non-minority group (subjective signals).247 Subjective signals include
―any subjective information beyond the standard underwriting variables that
lenders gather during the application process. . . . [They are] often referred to
as ‗compensating factors.‘‖248 Consequently, lenders have more information
about the group with whom they share a cultural affinity; the information, if
positive, can be used by the lenders to compensate for negative information
243. See APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 70 (Unlike in the past, housing ―advocates today
must focus less on whether any lending takes place, and more on whether the lending that does take
place is done at the best rates and terms for which borrowers would qualify.‖).
244. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 650; Hunter & Walker, supra note 19, at 67–68;
Longhofer, supra note 156, at 19–20.
245. Longhofer, supra note 156, at 15.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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the lenders gathered in the evaluation process and captured as part of the
objective signaling.249 The new information may also be negative, suggesting
that, perhaps contrary to the objective signal, the borrower is a poor credit
risk.250 According to Longhofer, underlying the objective and subjective
signals is the basic fact that lenders trust information they receive about their
own group more than they trust the information they receive about other
groups, hence the cultural affinity effect. Finally, Longhofer suggests that
many lenders seem only rarely to reject applicants who have
passed the initial screen, raising the question of whether
negative overrides really do outnumber positive ones. Once a
[white] applicant has been approved using the first (objective)
signal, lenders may choose to ignore any additional ―bad‖
information they receive about that applicant or, perhaps more
likely, may never bother to observe the second signal at all.251
So, white borrowers have the benefit of objective and subjective
information available to the lender. If the objective information is negative,
the lender can use the subjective information to compensate, and if the
objective information is positive, the lender may never consider the subjective
information that might lead the lender to make a poor lending decision if the
subjective information is negative and overwhelms the positive objective
information. If lenders are not gathering as much subjective information from
black borrowers, the potential for using this information to compensate for
negative objective information is minimized. Further, I also suggest that in
addition to Longhofer‘s hypothesis, lenders make negative assumptions about
the nature of the subjective information that would be gathered from blacks
based on negative stereotypes, which further harms these borrowers.
If the first signal, the objective signal, correlates with the information that
secondary market institutions will require if they are to guarantee or purchase
the lender‘s loans, then the lenders who sell to the secondary market have
absolutely no incentive to consider negative information about borrowers who
are acceptable by secondary market institutions, even when lenders have
available to them negative subjective signals.252 The lender will always use
positive subjective signals though when the objective signals do not meet
secondary market standards of acceptability. Secondary market lenders permit
consideration of compensating factors when loans would not be acceptable on
the secondary market based upon the initial objective signal. And, even if the
lender cannot document that the loans‘ quality meets the secondary market‘s
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
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criteria, the lender could decide to hold a loan that is obviously creditworthy,
after considering the subjective signal, in its own portfolio.253
Longhofer draws several conclusions regarding the distorting effects of
secondary markets on discrimination in home mortgage lending. First,
assuming lenders have a cultural affinity with white borrowers, minority
borrowers will be denied loans more frequently than white borrowers when
lenders ignore the negative information contained in the subjective signal for
white borrowers.254 Second, even when lenders are not discriminating they
will appear to be discriminating against blacks by requiring them to meet
more stringent standards. And finally, it appears to outsiders that lenders are
holding blacks more stringently to traditional underwriting criteria than white
applicants.255
An absolute risk is associated with lenders‘ misunderstanding or biased
perceptions of the black economy, even when these borrowers‘ objective
measures such as FICO and credit scores surpass the lenders‘ own articulated
standards.
A belief in black intellectual inferiority makes investments in
black people, their property, and their communities seem
riskier than comparable investments in whites. A belief that
black borrowers are stupid or incompetent will lead to . . .
higher interest rates, demands for more information, and
higher transaction costs in credit transactions involving
blacks. Some blacks have internalized these notions. Others
have accommodated their financial practices and preferences
to them. Fear of being denied credit, for example, drives
some creditworthy blacks to seek loans in the fringe or
subprime sector where they receive money on less favorable
terms than comparably situated whites.256
Historically, lenders simply denied many black borrowers‘ loans.257
Today, instead of expressing their worry about risk by denying loans, lenders
have absorbed this risk and managed their worry with higher rates and poorer
loan terms for black borrowers.258 Risk has thus become translated into less
attractive products that are more likely to default.
Moreover, evidence of higher default rates among black borrowers than
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Austin, supra note 5, at 1251 (citations omitted).
257. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
258. Lenders are even charging rates that exceed what can be explained based upon borrower
risk factors and neighborhood risk factors. See APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 40.
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white borrowers may provide a motive for lenders to steer the former toward
subprime products, even when the individual applicant meets or exceeds the
lenders‘ loan criteria.259 There is not a lot of available information on default
rates by race.260 The information that does exist suggests that black borrowers
default at a higher rate than white borrowers, even after controlling for the
borrowers’ relevant economic characteristics.261 Ironically, this practice of
steering may actually have the opposite of its intended effect and may
increase lenders‘ risk as borrowers laden with excessive monthly mortgage
payments may be more likely to default than similarly situated borrowers with
lower monthly payments.262 Additionally, some studies have measured
borrower default by looking at lender foreclosures.263 Lenders exercise
discretion when deciding whether to foreclose; thus, studies that measure
borrower default rates based upon lender foreclosure statistics may be
capturing information about lender preferences and behavior rather than
information purely about borrowers‘ behaviors.
One can argue that higher default rates among black borrowers justify the
higher representations of these borrowers in the subprime category and are
consistent with ―rational discrimination‖264 or profit maximization.265 These
results can also be explained as consistent with cultural affinity. ―[T]he added
screening costs brought about by ‗cultural affinities‘ . . . can lead to minorities
endogenously exhibiting higher default rates than do whites . . . .‖266 Cultural
affinities create higher costs that are passed on through more expensive,
subprime products—loans with higher interest rates, credit enhancements
such as private mortgage insurance, and higher fees. If the average likelihood
of default increases as the loan becomes more expensive and if cultural
affinity results in lenders pushing black borrowers into subprime loans when
similar white borrowers would be offered prime loans, black borrowers may
very well find themselves, more often than their white counterparts, in
situations where the interest rate reaches a critically high level in the face of
falling property values and it no longer makes economic sense to continue
paying the loan. And, moreover, lenders may not in all cases be harmed when
these defaulted loans are foreclosed. In some instances, lenders roll high

259. But see Ladd, supra note 69, at 47 (discussing why the process of selling loans in the
secondary market should make loan originators less concerned and focused on ―race-specific
probability of default‖).
260. Id. at 46; Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 653.
261. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 635.
262. APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 29.
263. Ladd, supra note 69, at 54.
264. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 650 n.25.
265. Id. at 650.
266. Id. at 635.
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front-end fees into the mortgage, which then may be paid out of the equity
(assuming there is any) as part of the lender‘s foreclosure process.267 These
fees may be sufficient to compensate the lender for the default.268
Regina Austin makes a compelling argument that this country‘s history of
racial discrimination in lending has resulted in creating a dual currency
system in which the money of blacks is literally worth less than that of
whites.269 Her argument offers an alternative understanding of the perceived
risk associated with black people‘s money. She contends that
[t]hrough blacks‘ historic confinement to segregated markets
immune to legal attack and the operation of a culture of
dealing that is permeated by economic stereotypes and
practices borne of blacks‘ unequal material conditions, money
in the hands of black Americans has come to be devalued like
the currency of a ―Third World‖ country. The devaluation
has taken on a life of its own. The assumption that black
people‘s money is worth less taints commercial transactions
of all sorts and perpetuates blacks‘ subordinate economic
status. Nowhere is the adverse impact of this interaction of
race, culture, law, and economics, better reflected than in the
area of personal finance and the lack of success that blacks
encounter in transactions with financial institutions and other
firms dealing in money as a commodity.270
Segregation forced black borrowers into an informal economy, meaning
an economy that was largely unregulated and that was little understood by
those operating in the formal economy.271 Thus, little value and social
significance was attached to their money. These borrowers are perceived as
riskier and worthy of relegation to second-class credit.
Black borrowers have accepted these less attractive subprime and
predatory products. The products are less attractive to the extent these loans
are more expensive than what black borrowers‘ objective measures would
indicate they are entitled to receive. Perhaps black borrowers accept these
products because they do not know that better terms are available (due to
historic denials to the social interactions with those who have traditionally
dealt in the formal credit economy);272 perhaps because though they know
better loan terms are available, they have grown accustomed, over time, to
267. APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 66.
268. Id.
269. Austin, supra note 5, at 1218.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1257 (―Blacks are not alone in having a lower value attached to their money. Other
minorities, including women and the poor, are essentially in the same boat.‖).
272. See supra Part II.
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less attractive loan terms and do not believe that they can borrow on better
terms;273 or perhaps because in their experience, the market just will not give
them better products even when they demand better products. Lenders
became aware that past discrimination created a vulnerable and therefore
valuable market of black borrowers. The history of the housing and financing
markets stacked the cards against this group of borrowers, making it virtually
inevitable that, when these subprime and predatory loan incentives came
along, lenders believed they could target black borrowers without acting
illegally. Past discrimination limited the ability of black borrowers to develop
credit histories and to participate in the formal credit economy. So now,
lenders cannot relate to these borrowers, and the lack of cultural affinity
reinforces the risk lenders associate with lending to them.
The poor credit histories, FICO scores, income histories, and other
objective factors lined up perfectly for many black borrowers and justified
their relegation to the subprime market. Even when these objective factors
indicated the contrary—that black borrowers qualified for prime products—
many lenders steered them into the subprime market anyway. Driven by
cynicism, lenders‘ approaches to lending to black borrowers resulted in this
intent to discriminate.
VII. CONCLUSION
What is happening today in the subprime market to black borrowers is a
result of prior discrimination in housing and lending.274
Historic
discrimination has consistently, over time, secured white prosperity,
undermined black acquisition of property, and facilitated the divestment of
property from blacks who managed to acquire this important resource.275
[T]he old inequality helped to make the new inequality
possible. The new inequality in home mortgage lending is
part of a greater phenomenon in which apparent gains made
by [blacks] have come at far higher costs than have gains
made by other segments of society. While we might
reasonably argue that the new forms of inequality are better
than the old, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is
inequality, nonetheless: recent gains in credit for underserved
markets have come with a price.276
The proper role of government in addressing the subprime mortgage
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See supra notes 1–5 and Parts I–II.
276. Williams et al., supra note 6, at 182; see also APGAR ET AL., supra note 29 (stating that
changes in the mortgage market pose new challenges for neighborhoods once the targets of
redlining).
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market failures depends upon the sources and causes of these failures. Black
borrowers are being steered into subprime products because of cultural
affinities and lenders‘ obsessions with maximizing profit by targeting
emerging populations. Policies should be designed to ensure the suitability of
borrowers for the loans they receive and to punish lenders who attempt to
trade upon the disadvantages borne from past discrimination to further isolate
historically disadvantaged borrowers.
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TABLE 1: 2006 DIFFERENCE OF MEANS DATA

State Race277

%
Applying
Total # of to HUD- Standard Pr(T<t)281
Applicants278 Classified Error280
Subprime
Lenders279

AL White

236,937

0.149

0.001

Black

72,046

0.315

0.002

AK White

39,469

0.154

0.002

Black

1,651

0.260

0.011

AZ White

749,919

0.187

0.000

Black

33,455

0.222

0.002

AR White

127,358

0.119

0.001

Black

16,113

0.278

0.004

2,614,907

0.202

0.000

Black

280,327

0.277

0.001

CO White

480,405

0.147

0.001

Black

21,305

0.267

0.003

CT White

234,178

0.191

0.001

Black

33,251

0.347

0.003

DE White

64,484

0.160

0.001

Black

19,308

0.289

0.003

DC White

17,978

0.060

0.002

Black

26,944

0.208

0.002

White

1,755,419

0.214

0.000

Black

322,716

0.369

0.001

CA White

FL

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

%
% of Loans
Accepted
3+ Points
at HUD- Standard
over
Standard
Pr(T<t)
Pr(T<t)
Classified Error
Comparable Error
Subprime
Treasury
Lenders282
Rate283
0.084

0.001

0.232

0.002

0.081

0.002

0.165

0.012

0.140

0.001

0.201

0.003

0.070

0.001

0.219

0.004

0.151

0.000

0.249

0.001

0.088

0.001

0.217

0.004

0.116

0.001

0.304

0.004

0.096

0.001

0.234

0.004

0.042

0.002

0.181

0.002

0.159

0.000

0.327

0.001

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.148

0.002

0.262

0.014

0.225

0.001

0.322

0.004

0.201

0.001

0.331

0.005

0.209

0.000

0.325

0.001

0.154

0.001

0.311

0.005

0.158

0.001

0.364

0.004

0.093

0.003

0.311

0.004

0.258

0.000

0.413

0.001

0.148

0.002

0.318

0.005

0.174

0.001

0.364

0.001

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

277. Race of the borrower.
278. Total number of applicants for mortgages in that particular state of each race.
279. Percentage of applicants applying for loans from subprime lenders, as classified by
appearance on the 2005 HUD subprime lender list.
280. The standard error, or the standard deviation of the sampling estimate.
281. The probability that the differences in percentages between white and black borrowers is
due to chance.
282. The percentage of loans accepted by subprime lenders, as classified by appearance on the
2005 HUD subprime lender list.
283. The percentage of loans accepted by subprime lenders, as classified by a loan rate of three
points or more above the comparable Treasury rate.
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%
Applying
Total # of to HUD- Standard Pr(T<t)281
Applicants278 Classified Error280
Subprime
Lenders279

GA White

516,012

0.141

0.000

Black

288,685

0.304

0.001

White

43,083

0.134

0.002

Black

1,985

0.210

0.009

White

150,911

0.143

0.001

Black

732

0.217

0.015

White

824,327

0.194

0.000

Black

180,788

0.382

0.001

White

413,193

0.192

0.001

Black

43,735

0.337

0.002

White

178,577

0.183

0.001

Black

3,736

0.297

0.297

KS White

229,589

0.161

0.001

Black

17,496

0.275

0.003

KY White

229,589

0.161

0.001

Black

17,496

0.275

0.003

LA White

182,534

0.128

0.001

Black

62,383

0.309

0.002

ME White

93,649

0.203

0.001

521

0.365

0.021

MD White

357,272

0.184

0.001

Black

233,611

0.322

0.001

MA White

420,222

0.183

0.001

Black

38,055

0.365

0.002

MI White

685,344

0.185

0.000

Black

143,851

0.365

0.001

MN White

362,778

0.175

0.001

Black

22,817

0.333

0.003

MS White

102,539

0.134

0.001

Black

44,083

0.337

0.002

HI

ID

IL

IN

IA

Black

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00
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%
% of Loans
Accepted
3+ Points
at HUD- Standard
over
Standard
Pr(T<t)
Pr(T<t)
Classified Error
Comparable Error
Subprime
Treasury
Lenders282
Rate283
0.078

0.000

0.235

0.001

0.101

0.002

0.176

0.011

0.092

0.001

0.165

0.019

0.132

0.000

0.329

0.002

0.105

0.001

0.260

0.003

0.105

0.001

0.213

0.009

0.100

0.001

0.215

0.004

0.100

0.001

0.215

0.004

0.086

0.001

0.257

0.003

0.127

0.001

0.272

0.027

0.119

0.001

0.259

0.001

0.114

0.001

0.320

0.003

0.109

0.000

0.311

0.002

0.096

0.001

0.289

0.004

0.078

0.001

0.248

0.003

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.141

0.002

0.240

0.012

0.092

0.001

0.165

0.019

0.187

0.001

0.277

0.023

0.206

0.001

0.433

0.003

0.219

0.001

0.420

0.003

0.129

0.001

0.177

0.006

0.200

0.001

0.334

0.005

0.128

0.001

0.309

0.002

0.206

0.001

0.387

0.003

0.127

0.001

0.272

0.027

0.189

0.001

0.367

0.001

0.158

0.001

0.373

0.004

0.204

0.001

0.431

0.002

0.182

0.001

0.397

0.005

0.243

0.002

0.409

0.003

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00
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Total # of to HUD- Standard Pr(T<t)281
Applicants278 Classified Error280
Subprime
Lenders279

MO White

408,997

0.181

0.001

Black

67,230

0.381

0.002

MT White

60,629

0.113

0.001

155

0.181

0.031

NE White

93,306

0.173

0.001

Black

4,362

0.336

0.007

NV White

305,752

0.193

0.001

Black

26,978

0.245

0.003

NH White

105,835

0.169

0.001

Black

1,221

0.291

0.013

White

555,662

0.161

0.000

Black

101,062

0.289

0.001

NM White

141,678

0.187

0.001

3,455

0.253

0.007

NY White

711,388

0.191

0.000

Black

152,771

0.370

0.001

NC White

513,173

0.125

0.0004

Black

126,564

0.270

0.001

ND White

27,021

0.142

0.002

144

0.174

0.032

OH White

681,629

0.195

0.000

Black

99,464

0.337

0.001

OK White

200,364

0.181

0.001

Black

17,361

0.336

0.004

OR White

325,626

0.137

0.001

6,240

0.172

0.005

PA White

783,866

0.172

0.000

Black

88,115

0.273

0.002

White

80,377

0.235

0.001

Black

5,367

0.389

0.007

Black

NJ

Black

Black

Black

RI

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.14

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00
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%
% of Loans
Accepted
3+ Points
at HUD- Standard
over
Standard
Pr(T<t)
Pr(T<t)
Classified Error
Comparable Error
Subprime
Treasury
Lenders282
Rate283
0.108

0.001

0.316

0.003

0.066

0.001

0.134

0.038

0.104

0.001

0.261

0.009

0.144

0.001

0.229

0.004

0.108

0.001

0.215

0.018

0.105

0.001

0.239

0.002

0.102

0.001

0.172

0.009

0.121

0.001

0.330

0.002

0.074

0.0004

0.210

0.002

0.077

0.002

0.099

0.030

0.119

0.001

0.282

0.002

0.108

0.001

0.265

0.005

0.085

0.001

0.152

0.007

0.093

0.000

0.222

0.002

0.148

0.002

0.329

0.009

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.206

0.001

0.438

0.003

0.168

0.002

0.244

0.048

0.193

0.002

0.407

0.010

0.144

0.001

0.229

0.004

0.166

0.001

0.285

0.019

0.170

0.001

0.351

0.002

0.187

0.001

0.285

0.010

0.184

0.001

0.379

0.002

0.151

0.0006

0.344

0.002

0.170

0.003

0.168

0.037

0.203

0.001

0.402

0.002

0.225

0.001

0.384

0.005

0.085

0.001

0.152

0.007

0.160

0.001

0.357

0.002

0.190

0.002

0.395

0.009

0.00

0.03

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.51

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00
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%
Applying
Total # of to HUD- Standard Pr(T<t)281
Applicants278 Classified Error280
Subprime
Lenders279

SC White

259,548

0.142

0.001

Black

69,599

0.344

0.002

SD White

42,893

0.133

0.002

297

0.185

0.023

TN White

374,627

0.176

0.001

Black

80,196

0.378

0.002

1,255,524

0.195

0.000

Black

200,971

0.383

0.001

UT White

280,542

0.147

0.001

Black

1,881

0.204

0.009

VT White

34,618

0.174

0.002

228

0.232

0.028

VA White

512,606

0.147

0.000

Black

153,315

0.296

0.001

WA White

561,746

0.157

0.000

Black

25,395

0.241

0.003

WV White

96,347

0.122

0.001

Black

3,052

0.199

0.007

WI White

392,062

0.160

0.001

Black

30,514

0.365

0.003

WY White

38,405

0.157

0.002

299

0.271

0.026

Black

TX White

Black

Black

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.0096

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

961

%
% of Loans
Accepted
3+ Points
at HUD- Standard
over
Standard
Pr(T<t)
Pr(T<t)
Classified Error
Comparable Error
Subprime
Treasury
Lenders282
Rate283
0.083

0.001

0.269

0.002

0.066

0.001

0.043

0.017

0.107

0.001

0.303

0.002

0.126

0.000

0.330

0.001

0.099

0.001

0.165

0.011

0.110

0.002

0.154

0.031

0.090

0.000

0.230

0.001

0.101

0.000

0.212

0.004

0.075

0.001

0.153

0.009

0.088

0.001

0.295

0.004

0.088

0.002

0.190

0.030

0.00

0.86

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.173

0.001

0.374

0.003

0.170

0.002

0.209

0.035

0.193

0.001

0.373

0.002

0.204

0.000

0.368

0.002

0.185

0.001

0.296

0.014

0.141

0.002

0.235

0.037

0.166

0.001

0.342

0.002

0.178

0.001

0.314

0.004

0.221

0.002

0.303

0.012

0.173

0.001

0.443

0.004

0.194

0.002

0.293

0.035

0.00

0.86

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00
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TABLE 2: 2002 DIFFERENCE OF MEANS DATA
2002 SUBPRIME LENDING
Number of Loan
Applicants

% Applying to
Subprime Lenders

Pr(T < t)

% Accepted at HUDClassified Subprime
Lenders

Pr(T < t)

WHITE

13,867,631

0.0912

0

0.0725

0.05

BLACK

1,211,921

0.163

0.1233

TABLE 3: 1998 DIFFERENCE OF MEANS DATA
1998 SUBPRIME LENDING
Number of Loan
Applicants

% Applying to
Subprime Lenders

Pr(T < t)

% Accepted at HUDClassified Subprime
Lenders

Pr(T < t)

WHITE

10,503,741

0.0753

0

0.0651

0.12

BLACK

1,294,019

0.1323

0.0752

2010]
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FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF APPLICATIONS NATIONALLY TO
HUD-CLASSIFIED SUBPRIME LENDERS BY RACE

FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF LOANS ORIGINATED FROM SUBPRIME LENDERS
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TABLE 4: 2006 CONTROL DATA—ALTERNATIVE MEASURE
(LOAN IS 3+ POINTS ABOVE COMPARABLE TREASURY RATE)284
Median
Increase of
Loan
Income OwnerBlack
HUD
Minority
Income Constant Probability
State
Amount
of
Occupied
291
292
Applicant285 286 Income287 Population288
for Black
MSA Housing290
Applicant293
289
AL

0.014

-0.004

0.000

-0.002

-0.005

0.000

0.000

0.010

4.7%

AK

0.459

-0.002* 0.000*

-0.001

-0.003

0.000

0.001

-1.921

5.2%

AZ

0.151

-0.001

0.000

0.007

-0.002

0.000*

0.000* -2.497

5.2%

AR

0.298

-0.004

0.000

-0.004

-0.007

0.000

0.000* 0.685

3.9%

CA

0.299

0.000*

0.000

0.002

-0.011

0.000*

0.000* -0.417

3.4%

CO

0.327

-0.002

0.000

0.005

-0.003

0.000

0.001

-2.037

2.3%

CT

0.417

0.001

0.000

0.005

-0.011

0.000

-0.002

0.556

3.2%

DE

0.470

-0.001

0.000

0.003

-0.007

0.000

0.000

-1.698

5.2%

DC

0.775

0.000*

—

0.016

-0.001*

0.000

0.000

-3.652

7.8%

FL

0.170

-0.001

0.000

0.007

-0.002

0.000

0.000

-1.184

5%

GA

0.513

-0.003

0.000

-0.001

-0.003

0.000

0.000

-1.055

6.5%

HI

0.066*

-0.001

0.000

0.005

-0.007

0.000*

0.000

-0.060

—

ID

0.224

-0.002

0.000

0.004

-0.005

0.000

0.001

-1.831

5.3%

IL

0.317

-0.001

0.000*

0.003

-0.005

0.000*

0.000* -1.437

3.7%

IN

0.212

-0.003

0.000

0.002*

-0.006

0.000*

0.000

-0.849

4.2%

IA

0.105

-0.002

0.000

0.004

-0.005

0.000

0.001

-1.814

2.7%

KS

0.274

-0.003

0.000*

-0.001

-0.005

0.000

0.000* -1.029

2.3%

KY

0.326

-0.003

0.000

-0.001*

-0.004

0.000*

0.000* -0.712

6.1%

284. Estimating the effect of race, borrower characteristics, and neighborhood characteristics
on the likelihood that a borrower receives a loan that is three points or more above the comparable
Treasury rate.
285. Dummy variable representing whether or not the borrower was black (versus white).
286. Amount of the loan (in thousands of dollars).
287. The maximum income for qualification for HUD services in the census tract.
288. The percentage of the census tract that is not white.
289. The median income (in thousands) in the MSA.
290. The percentage of housing in the census tract that is owner-occupied.
291. The income of the borrower (in thousands).
292. The constant, or the baseline level of subprime lending, represents the base probability of
receiving a subprime loan (i.e., the log odds that a white person receives subprime loan).
293. The change in probability if all other variables are kept at their means, but the race of the
borrower changes from white to black. This is calculated using Clarify software, developed by Gary
King.
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Median
Increase of
Loan
Income OwnerBlack
HUD
Minority
Income Constant Probability
State
Amount
of
Occupied
291
292
Applicant285 286 Income287 Population288
for Black
MSA Housing290
Applicant293
289
LA

0.324

-0.003

0.000

-0.002

-0.004

0.000

0.000

-0.599

6.2%

ME

0.427

0.000*

0.000

0.002

-0.010

0.000

0.000* -0.336

3.8%

MD

0.541

0.000

0.000

0.004

-0.005

0.000

0.001

-0.552

10%

MA

0.401

-0.001

0.000

0.000*

-0.007

0.000*

0.000

0.234

3.3%

MI

0.270

-0.002

0.000

0.002

-0.004

0.000

0.000

-0.892

5.8%

MN

0.543

-0.002

0.000

0.001

-0.007

0.000

0.000

-0.885

4.2%

MS

0.206

-0.004

0.000

-0.002

-0.005

0.000

0.000

-0.194

7.1%

MO

0.343

-0.002

0.000

0.001

-0.005

0.000

0.000

-1.081

4.1%

MT

0.278*

-0.003

0.000

-0.005

-0.005

0.000

0.000

0.105

3.1%

NE

0.359

-0.003

0.000

0.003

-0.007

0.000*

0.000* 0.230

6.1%

NV

0.235

-0.002

0.000

0.012

0.000*

0.000

0.000

0.870

2.8%

NH

0.241

-0.001

0.000

-0.001*

-0.010

0.000*

0.000* -0.174

3.6%

NJ

0.299

0.000

0.000

0.006

-0.007

0.000

0.000* -0.984

3.1%

NM

0.306

-0.002

0.000*

0.002

-0.002

0.000*

0.000

-1.555

3.8%

NY

0.295

0.000

0.000

0.005

-0.005

0.000

0.000

-1.970

2.1%

NC

0.235

-0.002

0.000

0.012

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.870

5.5%

ND

0.090*

-0.004* 0.000*

-0.006*

-0.009*

OH

0.331

-0.002

0.000

0.000

-0.006

—

0.000

-0.986

6.1%

OK

0.253

-0.004

0.000

-0.002

-0.005

0.000

0.000

-0.549

4.1%

OR

0.211

-0.002

0.000

0.002

-0.005

0.000

0.000

-1.530

2.2%

PA

0.364

0.000*

0.000

0.001

-0.009

0.000

0.000

-0.425

3.1%

RI

0.298

0.000

—

0.002

-0.012

0.000

0.000* -0.908

2.6%

SC

0.356

-0.003

0.000

-0.001*

-0.004

0.000

0.000

3.9%

SD

-0.162*

-0.007* 0.000*

-0.001*

-0.007*

0.000*

0.000* 0.093*

TN

0.457

-0.001

0.000

-0.001

-0.006

0.000

0.000

-0.379

6.2%

TX

0.363

-0.001

0.000

0.003

-0.003

0.000

0.000* -1.271

4.1%

UT

0.298

-0.002

0.000

0.008

-0.002

0.000

0.001

-2.017

1.2%

VT

0.429

-0.001

0.000

0.003

-0.007

0.000

0.000

-1.372

2.5%

VA

0.526

0.000

0.000

-0.020*

-0.013

0.000

-0.002

0.933

5.4%

WA

0.344

-0.002

0.000

0.000*

-0.006

0.000*

0.001

-1.199

4.3%

WV

0.242

-0.002

0.000

-0.003

-0.007

0.000*

-0.001 -0.782

5.1%

0.000* -0.002* 0.279*

-0.987

—

—
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Median
Increase of
Loan
Income OwnerBlack
HUD
Minority
Income Constant Probability
State
Amount
of
Occupied
291
292
Applicant285 286 Income287 Population288
for Black
MSA Housing290
Applicant293
289
WI

0.373

-0.001

0.000

0.003

-0.008

0.000*

-0.001 -0.482

3.4%

WY

0.338

-0.004

0.000

0.006

0.000*

0.000*

0.000* 9.456

0.5%

* = Statistically insignificant; Pr < 0.05 = Variable had too little variation to be included in the model

TABLE 5: 2006 CONTROL DATA—HUD-CLASSIFIED SUBPRIME LENDER294
Median
Increase of
Loan
Income OwnerBlack
HUD
Minority
Income Constant Probability
State
Amount
of
Occupied
301
302
Applicant295 296 Income297 Population298
for Black
MSA Housing300
Applicant303
299
AL

0.848

0.000

0.000

0.000*

-0.004

0.000*

-0.002 -0.535

AK

0.671

-0.001

0.000

0.003

-0.002

0.000

-0.001

1.850

14%

AZ

0.293

0.000

0.000

0.001

-0.006

0.000*

0.000

-0.670

9.3%

AR

0.918

0.000*

0.000

0.002

-0.001

0.000

-0.001 -2.455

13.6%

CA

0.417

0.001

0.000

0.005

-0.011

0.000*

-0.002

5.3%

CO

0.546

0.000

0.000

0.006

-0.007

0.000*

-0.001 -2.371

CT

0.299

0.000

0.000

0.002

-0.011

0.000

0.000

-0.417

7.2%

DE

0.551

0.001

0.000

0.004

-0.006

0.000

-0.005 -1.500

8.9%

DC

1.031

0.001

—

0.020

0.001*

0.000*

0.000* -4.479

13.1%

FL

0.552

0.000

0.000

0.008

-0.002

0.000

-0.002 -0.643

9.3%

GA

0.861

0.000

0.000

0.002

-0.004

0.000

-0.002 -0.990

14.3%

HI

0.470

0.000*

0.000

0.011

-0.006

0.000*

-0.001 -0.873

—

0.556

11.3%

8%

294. Estimating the effect of race, borrower characteristics, and neighborhood characteristics
on the likelihood that a borrower receives a loan from a HUD-Classified Subprime Lender versus
receiving a loan from a prime lender.
295. Dummy variable representing whether the borrower was black (versus white).
296. Amount of the loan (in thousands of dollars).
297. The maximum income for qualification for HUD services in the census tract.
298. The percentage of the census tract that is not white.
299. The median income (in thousands) in the MSA.
300. The percentage of housing in the census tract that is owner-occupied.
301. The income of the borrower (in thousands).
302. The constant, or the baseline level of subprime lending, represents the base probability of
receiving a subprime loan (i.e., the log odds that a white person receives a subprime loan).
303. The change in probability if all other variables are kept at their means, but the race of the
borrower changes from white to black. This is calculated using Clarify software, developed by Gary
King.
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Median
Increase of
Loan
Income OwnerBlack
HUD
Minority
Income Constant Probability
State
Amount
of
Occupied
301
302
Applicant295 296 Income297 Population298
for Black
MSA Housing300
Applicant303
299
ID

0.584

0.000

0.000

0.002*

-0.008

0.000

-0.002 -0.011*

12.3%

IL

0.513

0.001

0.000

0.006

-0.006

0.000*

-0.001 -1.441

11.2%

IN

0.513

0.002

0.000

0.004

-0.008

0.000

-0.002

0.129

7.5%

IA

0.584

0.000

0.000

0.002*

-0.008

0.000

-0.002 -0.011

8.7%

KS

0.597

0.002

0.000

0.002

-0.006

0.000

-0.003 -0.880

12.1%

KY

0.603

0.001

0.000

0.002

-0.006

0.000

-0.004 -0.191

9%

LA

1.029

0.001

0.000

0.000*

-0.004

0.000

-0.001 -1.801

12.8%

ME

0.844

0.002

0.000

-0.009

-0.010

0.000*

-0.003

1.421

14.6%

MD

0.408

-0.0007

0.000

0.003

-0.005

0.000

0.001

-1.459

5.8%

MA

0.582

0.001

0.000

0.005

-0.011

0.000

-0.002

0.574

10.1%

MI

0.517

0.002

0.000

0.005

-0.007

0.000

-0.002

0.296

6.1%

MN

0.821

0.001

0.000

0.004

-0.008

0.000

-0.001 -0.159

13.2%

MS

1.067

0.001

0.000

0.003

-0.001

0.000

-0.002 -1.972

14.2%

MO

0.708

0.001

0.000

0.004

-0.007

0.000

-0.003 -0.711

12.1%

MT

0.638

0.000

0.000

0.006

-0.006

0.000

-0.002

0.979

9.9%

NE

0.664

0.002

0.000

0.005

-0.008

0.000

-0.001

0.549

10.4%

NV

0.259

0.000

0.000

0.014

-0.001

0.000

-0.001 -0.429

11.6%

NH

0.775

0.002

0.000

-0.016

-0.011

0.000

-0.004

1.244

11%

NJ

0.412

0.001

0.000

0.006

-0.006

0.000*

-0.002 -0.810

7.1%

NM

0.375

0.000

0.000

0.004

-0.003

0.000*

-0.002 -0.436

9.2%

NY

0.407

0.001

0.000

0.009

-0.004

0.000

-0.001 -1.699

12.3%

NC

0.259

0.000

0.000

0.014

-0.001

0.000

-0.001 -0.429

9.3%

ND

0.265*

0.002*

0.000*

-0.005*

-0.003*

0.000* -0.003* -0.050*

OH

0.549

0.002

0.000

0.001

-0.008

—

OK

0.702

0.002

0.000

0.001

-0.004

OR

0.329

0.000

0.000

0.004

PA

0.460

0.003

0.000

RI

0.232

0.002

SC

0.943

SD
TN

-0.003

—

0.224

11.9%

0.000

-0.001 -1.310

9.1%

-0.006

0.000

-0.002 -0.695

8.7%

0.001

-0.008

0.000

-0.004

0.544

11.2%

—

0.006

-0.013

0.000

-0.003 -0.423

7.6%

0.000

0.000

0.002

-0.005

0.000*

-0.003 -0.790

15.5%

0.293*

0.000*

0.000*

0.001*

-0.006*

0.000*

0.000* -0.670*

—

0.935

0.000

0.000

0.002

-0.004

0.000*

-0.003 -0.246

13.3%
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Median
Increase of
Loan
Income OwnerBlack
HUD
Minority
Income Constant Probability
State
Amount
of
Occupied
301
302
Applicant295 296 Income297 Population298
for Black
MSA Housing300
Applicant303
299
TX

0.828

0.001

0.000

0.007

-0.002

0.000

-0.002 -1.137

15.2%

UT

0.373

0.000

0.000

0.017

-0.003

0.000

-0.001 -0.708

10%

VT

0.464

0.001

0.000

-0.048

-0.016

0.000

-0.002

1.948

9.6%

VA

0.704

0.000

0.000

0.002

-0.007

0.000

-0.003 -0.624

9.2%

WA

0.536

0.000

0.000

0.003

-0.007

0.000

-0.002 -0.351

13.3%

WV

0.491

0.002

0.000*

0.006

-0.001

0.000

-0.006 -1.655

12.2%

WI

0.559

0.001

0.000

0.004

-0.010

0.000

-0.002

0.119

6.9%

WY

0.643

0.000*

0.000

-0.002*

-0.004

0.000

-0.001 -7.122

9.1%

TABLE 6: 2006, 2002, AND 1998 CONTROL DATA—HUD-CLASSIFIED
SUBPRIME LENDER

Year
2006

Black
Loan
HUD
Applicant Amount Income
0.324

Minority
Population

Median
Income
of MSA

OwnerOccupied
Housing
0

0.001

0.000

0.003

-0.004

2002

0.19825 -0.001

0.000*

0.002*

-0.005

1998

0.12362 -0.002

-0.001

0.002

-0.008

Income Constant
0

-0.653

-0.01

-0.01

-1.892

-0.015

-0.012

-2.348

